

# Notes

## Introduction

- 1 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption: the Role of the World Bank* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 2.
- 2 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 3.
- 3 Linn, J. (2001), 'The World Bank's New Approach to Good Governance: Promises and Risks', *Transition Newsletter*, 12 (2), p. 2.
- 4 World Bank (1944), *Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (amended 1989)*, Internet, 4 November 1998, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrdr/arttoc.htm>.
- 5 Cassen, R. (1994), *Does Aid Work?*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 212–13.
- 6 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion: the World Bank and the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc.), p. 2.
- 7 Wolfensohn, J. D. (1999), 'Plenary Address', 9<sup>th</sup> International Anti-Corruption Conference, Durban, South Africa, 10–15 October.
- 8 Robinson, M. (1998), 'Corruption and Development: an Introduction', in Robinson, M. (ed.), *Corruption and Development* (London: Frank Cass), p. 2.
- 9 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, pp. 18–19.
- 10 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 1.
- 11 Doig, A. and Theobald, R. (2000), 'Introduction: Why Corruption?', in Doig, A. and Theobald, R. (eds), *Corruption and Democratisation* (London: Frank Cass), p. 4.
- 12 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997), 'The Political Economy of Corruption', in Elliot, K. (ed.), *Corruption and the Global Economy* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics), p. 32.
- 13 Gold, Sir J. (1983), 'Political Considerations are Prohibited by Articles of Agreement when the Fund Considers Requests for Use of Resources', *IMF Survey*, 23 May, p. 147. Although Gold is referring specifically to the IMF, the same applies to the Bank.
- 14 Shihata, I. (2000), *The World Bank in a Changing World (Vol. III)* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), p. 165. Ibrahim Shihata is the former General Counsel of the World Bank.
- 15 George, S. and Sabelli, F. (1994), *Faith and Credit: the World Bank's Secular Empire* (London: Penguin Books), p. 150. Contains a partial quote from Shihata, I. (1991), *The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers).
- 16 World Bank (2001), 'Financial Strength', 1 February, available at [http://www.worldbank.org/debtsecurities/html/financial\\_strength.html](http://www.worldbank.org/debtsecurities/html/financial_strength.html).
- 17 See, for example, Nelson, P. (1995), *The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations: the Limits of Apolitical Development* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.); Weaver, C. (2000), 'The Discourse of Law and Economic

- Development in the World Bank', paper given at the MacArthur Conference on the Changing Role of Law in Emerging Markets and New Democracies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 24–26 March; Fleck, R. and Kilby, C. (2001), 'World Bank Independence: a Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence', mimeo.
- 18 Pollard, E. (ed.) (1994), *The Oxford Paperback Dictionary*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 33.
  - 19 See Hutchings, G. (1989). 'China Worried at Economic Cost of Crushing Dissent', *The Daily Telegraph*, 20 June.
  - 20 The Bank has little leverage over those countries who borrow little from it and can find adequate private finance – such as Botswana. In addition, it has little leverage over those countries with very high borrowing levels and who also find adequate private finance – such as India and China. It is the countries in between who are the most vulnerable with regard to Bank conditionality. Caufield writes, 'As [World] Bank officials are fond of observing – on condition of anonymity – if you owe a bank \$100,000, you worry; if you owe it \$100 million, the bank worries.' Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion: the World Bank and the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Henry Holt and Co.), p. 24.
  - 21 Ayres, R. (1883), *Banking on the Poor: the World Bank and World Poverty* (London: MIT Press), pp. 72–3.
  - 22 Baldwin, D. (1966), *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy 1943–1962*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 32. A recent statistical analysis suggests that US interests do play a role in some Bank lending decisions, but that patterns differ depending on US administration and economic and political circumstances. This relationship is thus, according to the study, evolving rather than stable. See Fleck, R. and Kilby, C. (2001), 'World Bank Independence', mimeo.
  - 23 Cited in Gillies, D. (1996), 'Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance', p. 115 (emphasis in original).
  - 24 Gillies, D. (1996), 'Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance', p. 105.
  - 25 Miller-Adams, M. (1999), *The World Bank: New Agendas in a Changing World* (London: Routledge), p. 22.
  - 26 Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power: the Life and Times of Robert McNamara* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.), pp. 544–47.
  - 27 Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973), *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution), p. 478. Caufield gives the examples of Romania, Brazil and Bangladesh, which all received large loans from the Bank under authoritarian regimes, but had their funding cut after subsequent (or in the case of Brazil, prior) democratic transitions. In these cases, right-wing authoritarian regimes were perceived as more effective managers of the economy, because they 'could move faster than the public will tolerate'. Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, pp. 209–12.
  - 28 For a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between democracy and development, see Chapter 3.
  - 29 Nelson, J. (1992), 'Good Governance: Democracy and Conditional Economic Aid', in Mosley, P. (ed.), *Development Finance and Policy Reform*:

- Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed Countries* (London: Macmillan Press), p. 310; Hoogvelt, A. (1997), *Globalization and the Post-Colonial World: the New Political Economy of Development* (London: Macmillan Press), p. 172; Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power*, p. 546.
- 30 Ayres, R. (1983), *Banking on the Poor*, p. 56.
- 31 Bank lending commenced in 1948; IDA lending commenced in 1961.
- 32 Illustrated by a 1976 quote from Henry Kissinger: 'Disaster relief is becoming increasingly a major part of our foreign policy'; cited in De Waal, A. (1997). 'Democratising the Aid Encounter in Africa', *International Affairs*, 73 (4), October, p. 625.
- 33 Hoogvelt, A. (1997), *Globalization and the Post-Colonial World*, p. 172.
- 34 In 1973, 24.6 per cent of total states were democracies, compared to 45.4 per cent in 1990. See Huntington, S. (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press), p. 26.
- 35 World Bank (2000), *Anticorruption in Transition: a Contribution to the Policy Debate* (Washington DC: World Bank), pp. 40–1.
- 36 World Bank (2000), *Anticorruption in Transition*, p. xxii.
- 37 World Bank (2000), *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: a World Bank Strategy* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 23.
- 38 World Bank (2000), *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance*, p. 23.
- 39 World Bank (2000), *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance*, p. 24.
- 40 World Bank (2000), *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance*, p. 77.
- 41 Cited in Saul, J. (1997), 'For Fear of Being Condemned as Old Fashioned: Liberal Democracy versus Popular Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 24 (73), p. 347.
- 42 Stiglitz resigned in late 1999 in somewhat controversial circumstances, criticizing the Bank's emphasis on growth over distribution and its use of conditionality. See Beattie, A. (1999), 'World Bank Aid Strategy Flawed says Stiglitz', *Financial Times*, 29 November; Lobe, J. (1999), 'Stiglitz Calls for More Open Debate, Less Conditionality', *World News: Inter Press Service*, 30 November; Stiglitz, J. (1999), 'The World Bank at the Millennium', *The Economic Journal*, 109 (November): F577–F597. For an interesting exposé of Stiglitz's acrimonious departure from the Bank following these criticisms, see Wade, R. (2001), 'Showdown at the World Bank', *New Left Review*, January/February, pp. 124–37. His replacement has proven even more controversial: Professor Nick Stern, former chief economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), whose brother, Richard Stern, is the Bank's human resources vice president. The Bank's rules specifically forbid the employment of close family members. This has led not only to external criticism but also to criticism from the Bank's staff association, who warn President Wolfensohn that such an appointment could be interpreted as nepotism and may 'ultimately demean the ability of staff to speak in a credible way with clients about corruption and hamper our work in issues of governance'. Atkinson, M. (2000), 'World Bank Accused of Nepotism and Corruption', *The Guardian* (London), 17 March,

- p. 28. Professor Stern was, however, appointed by Wolfensohn as chief economist in July 2000 despite such criticism.
- 43 Stiglitz, J. (2000), 'Introduction', in Gilbert, C. and Vines, D. (eds), *The World Bank: Structure and Policies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 3.
- 44 Stiglitz, J. (2000), 'Introduction', p. 4.
- 45 World Bank (2000), 'World Bank Ties \$4.7 BLN Jakarta Support to Democracy, Rights', *Development News*, 2/2.
- 46 Cited in World Bank (2000), 'World Bank Official Warns Asia to Fight Corruption', *Development News*, 14/2. Original: *International Herald Tribune*, 12/2, p. 12. Mamadou Dia, World Bank Country Director for Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, told a news briefing that the Bank only dealt with 'constitutional governments', unless it could be proven that 'de facto' governments were stable and upheld international obligations. World Bank (2000), 'World Bank Warns of Aid Suspension for Côte d'Ivoire', *Development News*, 4/2. Although a constitutional government need not be a democracy, it is another example of the Bank publicly choosing one form of government over another.
- 47 'An amendment of the Bank's Articles of Agreement requires a formal approval by Bank members through a process which ultimately needs a majority of 60 percent of the members having 85 percent of the total voting power (80 percent in the case of IDA).' Shihata, I. (2000), *The World Bank in a Changing World, Vol. III* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), p. 152, note 35.
- 48 Kapur, D. and Webb, R. (2000), 'Governance-related Conditionality of the International Financial Institutions', G-24 Discussion Paper No. 6 (New York: UN), p. 16.
- 49 World Bank (2000), *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance*, p. 62.
- 50 Few would agree with Przeworski et al. who declare that 'we do not think that "accountability", "responsibility", "responsiveness" or "representation" should be treated as definitional features of democracies'. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A. and Limongi, F. (2000), *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 33. This reduces democracy to the notion of freely contestable elections, a dissatisfying notion of democracy for most.
- 51 A blank space does not imply disagreement with or indifference to the approach. The Bank does identify human rights as an important issue, but de-links rights from political issues. See World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development* (Washington DC: World Bank).
- 52 Phillip, B. (1997), 'The World Bank and Governance: a Process Approach to Policy Analysis', unpublished Phd thesis University of Pittsburgh, p. 70.
- 53 Weaver, C. (2000), 'The Discourse of Law and Economic Development in the World Bank', p. 19.
- 54 Cited in Weaver, C. (2000), 'The Discourse of Law and Economic Development in the World Bank', p. 19. Original: Tshuma, L. (1999), 'The Political Economy of the World Bank's Legal Framework for Economic Development', *Social & Legal Studies*, 8 (1), pp. 75–96.
- 55 Weaver, C. (2000), 'The Discourse of Law and Economic Development in the World Bank', p. 20.

- 56 Wolfensohn, J. D. (2000), 'NGO Meeting with Mr. Wolfensohn'. Prague, Czech Republic, 22 September. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/am00/ts092200a.htm>.
- 57 Center for Strategic and International Studies (1998), *The United States and the Multilateral Development Banks*, (Washington DC: CSIS Press), p. 40. It should be noted that the US Executive Director has shown no such reluctance. Indeed, the US government strongly supports the World Bank's anti-corruption initiatives and the changes initiated by Wolfensohn. See USGAO (2000), 'World Bank: Management Controls Stronger, but Challenges in Fighting Corruption Remain', Report to Congressional Committees, GAO/NSIAD-00-73, April.
- 58 Shihata, I. (2000), *The World Bank in a Changing World, Vol. III*, pp. 152–3, 148.

## 2 The Emergence of a Development Agency, 1944–1981

- 1 Biersteker refers to the 'mimetic' nature of the multilateral development bank (MDBs) and donor agencies. See, Biersteker, T. (1990), 'Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy: a Conceptual Exploration of IMF and World Bank Prescriptions', *International Studies Quarterly*, 34, pp. 477–92.
- 2 For an analysis of the way policy is developed at the Bank, see Miller-Adams, M. (1999), *The World Bank: New Agendas in a Changing World* (London: Routledge).
- 3 This role has grown in recent years. According to the Bank, 'The World Bank Group embarked on a new vision in 1996 – to become a Knowledge Bank that spurs the knowledge revolution in developing countries and acts as a global catalyst for creating, sharing, and applying the cutting-edge knowledge necessary for poverty reduction and economic development.' See <http://www.worldbank.org/knowledgebank/>.
- 4 Shihata, I. (2000), *The World Bank in a Changing World, Vol. III* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International), p. vii.
- 5 See, for example, Morgenthau, H. (1945). 'Bretton Woods and International Co-operation', *Foreign Affairs*, 23 (2), pp. 182–94.
- 6 Prepared by the Americans and British in Atlantic City in late June 1944.
- 7 Mikesell, R. (1994), 'The Bretton Woods Debates: a Memoir', *Essays in International Finance*, No. 192, Princeton University, pp. 4–5.
- 8 Article 1 of the Bank's Articles of Agreement, in World Bank (1944), *Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (amended 1989)*, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrdr/arttoc.htm>.
- 9 Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973), *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution), p. 51.
- 10 Four years after Bretton Woods, White was named as a communist spy, and was forced to testify before the Committee on UnAmerican Activities on 13 August 1948. Although acquitted, he died of a heart attack three days later. See Boughton, J. (1998). 'Harry Dexter White and the International Monetary Fund', *Finance & Development*, 35 (3), pp. 39–41.

- 11 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion: the World Bank and the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., Inc.), p. 51.
- 12 Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973), *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, p. 47.
- 13 Mikesell, R. (1994), 'The Bretton Woods Debates', p. 1.
- 14 Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973), *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, pp. 3–4.
- 15 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 53.
- 16 Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973), *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, p. 799.
- 17 Each member has 250 votes plus one additional vote for each share of stock held, with voting decided by majority (Art. V. Sec. 3). The five largest shareholders in 1946 were the US (30.73%), the UK (12.72%), China (6.01%), France (5.28%), and India (4.08% – took the place of the Soviet Union who declined membership). The five largest shareholders as of July 2002 are the US (16.40%), Japan (7.87%), Germany (4.49%), France (4.31%) and the UK (4.31%).
- 18 Myint, H. (1987), 'Neo-classical Development Analysis: Its Strengths and Limitations', in Meier, G. (eds), *Pioneers in Development*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank), p. 105.
- 19 Quoted in Bello, W. (1994), *Dark Victory: the United States, Structural Adjustment, and Global Poverty* (London: Pluto Press), p. 12. Original: Stone, R. (1992), *The Nature of Development: a Report from the Rural Tropics on the Quest for Sustainable Economic Growth* (New York: Alfred Knopf), p. 37.
- 20 See, for example, Wiles, P. (1953), 'The Soviet Economy Outpaces the West', *Foreign Affairs*, 31 (4), pp. 566–80; Dunayevskaya, R. (1944), 'A New Revision of Marxian Economics', *American Economic Review*, 34 (3), pp. 531–7; Dobb, M. (1948), *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.).
- 21 Dobb, M. (1948), *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, p. 2.
- 22 Preston, P. W. (1996), *Development Theory*, p. 159.
- 23 James, H. (1996), *International Monetary Co-operation Since Bretton Woods* (New York: Oxford University Press for the IMF), p. 122.
- 24 See, for example, List, F. (1885), *The National System of Political Economy*, trans. Loyd, S. (London: Longmans, Green and Co); Hoselitz, B. (1960), 'Theories of Stages of Economic Growth', in Hoselitz, B. (ed.), *Theories of Economic Growth*. (Glencoe, IL: Free Press), pp. 193–238; Cahnman, W. and Heberle, R. (1971), *Ferdinand Toennies on Sociology: Pure, Applied, and Empirical* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Gottlieb, R. (1992), *Marxism 1844–1990: Origins, Betrayal, Rebirth* (London: Routledge).
- 25 Here Rostow clearly sets his theory of economic growth apart from Marx, creating a capitalist 'alternative' to communism that developing countries could follow.
- 26 Rostow, W. W. (1960), *The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 103–4 (emphasis in original).
- 27 Hoselitz, B. (1960), 'Theories of Stages of Economic Growth', p. 234.

- 28 Meier, G. and Baldwin, R. (1957), *Economic Development: Theory, History, Policy* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), p. 145.
- 29 Kuznets, S. (1965), *Economic Growth and Structure: Selected Essays* (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.), p. 227.
- 30 In addition to a postwar State Department role as Assistant Chief of the German-Austrian Economic Division, Rostow served in several prominent positions for the US government.
- 31 Preston, P. W. (1996), *Development Theory*, p. 177.
- 32 Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973), *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, p. 97.
- 33 In 1949, Colombia became the first country to ask for the Bank's assistance in drawing up a plan for a loan application. Black sent a fourteen-person team (which included twelve Americans) to Colombia, resulting in a 642-page five-year plan. The Bank then helped the Colombian government set up a Commission on Economic Development (counselled by Bank staff) to analyse the report in order to determine whether or not to endorse it. When this was completed and the report had official government backing, the Bank helped to establish a National Planning Council to oversee execution of the plan (with Bank staff hired as permanent advisors). 'The Bank was now the driving force behind the decisions Colombia was making about its long-term development.' Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, pp. 58–9.
- 34 World Bank (1954), *The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1946–1953* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 9.
- 35 World Bank (1954), *The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1946–1953*, pp. 135–6.
- 36 Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973), *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, p. 62.
- 37 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 71.
- 38 Quoted in Mikesell, R. (1994), 'The Bretton Woods Debates', p. 6.
- 39 Williams, G. (1987), *Third World Political Organizations*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.), pp. 4–6.
- 40 Williams, G. (1987), *Third World Political Organizations*, p. 12.
- 41 Preston, P. W. (1996), *Development Theory*, p. 183.
- 42 Hettne, B. (1995), *Development Theory and the Three Worlds*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd.), pp. 251–2.
- 43 Prebisch, R. (1964), *Toward a New Trade Policy for Development* (New York: UNCTAD); also, Prebisch, R. (1971), *Change and Development: Latin America's Great Task: Report Submitted to the Inter-America Development Bank* (New York: Praeger).
- 44 Prebisch, R. (1964), *Toward a New Trade Policy for Development*, pp. 25–6, 113–14.
- 45 Frank, A. (1967), *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- 46 Cardoso, F. and Faletto, E. (1979), *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- 47 Nkrumah, K. (1965), *Neo-Colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd.); Woddis, J. (1967), *Introduction to Neo-Colonialism* (New York: International Publishers).

- 48 Nkrumah, K. (1965), *Neo-Colonialism*, p. ix.
- 49 The Henry J. Kaiser Co. was involved in a clear example of politically motivated lending and US political involvement in Bank affairs before Woods arrived at the Bank. In 1957, President Nkrumah of Ghana wanted to dam the Volta River to generate electricity for the processing of bauxite deposits into aluminium. The US government wanted the Bank to fund the project, rather than allowing Nkrumah to elicit funding from the Soviets, despite two separate Bank evaluation missions which determined the project was unattractive. The loan was initially declined but then the US State Department discovered that Nkrumah was flying to Moscow. Despite then Bank president Eugene Black's claim that, 'It isn't our business to make loans to prevent the spread of communism', the Bank quickly reversed their decision and approved the loan in 1961. Cited in Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion: the World Bank and the Poverty of Nations*, p. 83. The consequences of this ill-advised project included the displacement of over 80 000 villagers, a dramatic increase in disease, extensive famine, and loss of income from fishing due to increased salination in the water supply. George Woods became Bank president shortly after this transaction (1963–8), replacing Black. Woods was a board member of the Henry J. Kaiser Co. and returned to the board upon his departure from the Bank. Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, pp. 79–83.
- 50 The IDA is an agency of the World Bank that provides loans to the poorer countries at more favourable rates of interest and repayment and is funded solely through contributions from member countries. See Williams, M. (1994), *International Economic Organisations and the Third World* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf), pp. 101–9.
- 51 Quoted in Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 91.
- 52 Woods, G. (1966), 'The Development Decade in the Balance', *Foreign Affairs*, 44 (2), p. 206.
- 53 Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973), *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods*, p. 99.
- 54 Woods, G. (1966), 'The Development Decade in the Balance', p. 214.
- 55 Eichengreen, B. and Kenen, P. (1994), 'Managing the World Economy Under the Bretton Woods System: an Overview', in Kenen, P. (ed.), *Managing the World Economy Fifty Years After Bretton Woods* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics), pp. 5–6.
- 56 Keohane, R. (1984), *After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 9, 206–7; Peterson, P. (1971), *The United States in the Changing World Economy* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office), pp. ii, 11.
- 57 Keohane, R. (1984), *After Hegemony*, p. 186.
- 58 Bergsten, C. F. (1994), 'Managing the World Economy of the Future', in Kenen, P. (ed.), *Managing the World Economy Fifty Years After Bretton Woods*, p. 199.
- 59 Peterson, P. (1971), *The United States in the Changing World Economy*, p. 1; Bergsten, C. F. (1994), 'Managing the World Economy of the Future', pp. 199–200.
- 60 Cited in Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power: the Life and Times of Robert McNamara* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.), p. 381.



- 61 Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power*, p. 546.
- 62 Unlike the IBRD, which raises funds by selling its bonds in the financial markets and charges market rates for the money it lends, the IDA offers the poorest countries interest-free loans from funds that it receives from donor countries.
- 63 Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power*, p. 469.
- 64 McNamara, R. (1981), *The McNamara Years at the World Bank: Major Policy Addresses of Robert S. McNamara 1968–1981* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 6.
- 65 McNamara, R. (1981), *The McNamara Years at the World Bank*, p. 234.
- 66 Singer, H. (1994), 'Aid Conditionality'. IDS Discussion Paper No. 346, December, p. 2.
- 67 This problem of fungibility is still acknowledged by the Bank and is cited as one of the main reasons for the new Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), currently being piloted. Interview with World Bank staff member.
- 68 McNamara, R. (1981), *The McNamara Years at the World Bank*, p. 73.
- 69 Ardito-Barletta, N. (1994), 'Managing Development and Transition', in Kenen, P. (ed.), *Managing the World Economy Fifty Years After Bretton Woods*, p. 176.
- 70 McNamara, R. (1981), *The McNamara Years at the World Bank*, p. 240 (emphasis added).
- 71 Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power*, p. 669.
- 72 World Bank (1980), *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 14.
- 73 For example, a poor sugar harvest in Cuba, the USSR and Europe, combined with the OPEC oil embargo, forced sugar prices through the roof. In 1973, the world market price was GB£99.46, but increased to GB£305.13 in 1974; see, Mahler, V. (1981), 'Britain, the European Community, and the Developing Commonwealth: Dependence, Interdependence, and the Political Economy of Sugar', *International Organization*, 35 (3), Summer, p. 477.
- 74 McNamara, R. (1981), *The McNamara Years at the World Bank*, p. 275.
- 75 McNamara, R. (1981), *The McNamara Years at the World Bank*, p. 291.
- 76 Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power*, p. 518.
- 77 Williams, G. (1987), *Third World Political Organizations*, p. 82.
- 78 Figures for OECD members were converted into 1978 prices.
- 79 In 1949, when the communists came to power in China, they transferred seized dollars to the Soviet-owned Banque Commerciale pour L'Europe du Nord in Paris, creating the Eurodollar.
- 80 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, pp. 127–8.
- 81 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, pp. 127–8.
- 82 Mosley, P. et al. (1991), *Aid and Power: the World Bank and Policy-Based Lending (Vol. 1)* (London: Routledge), p. 6.
- 83 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 131.
- 84 McNamara, R. (1981), *The McNamara Years at the World Bank*, p. 494.
- 85 See, for example, Sachs, J. (ed.) (1989), *Developing Country Debt and the World Economy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Commins, S. (ed.) (1988), *Africa's Development Challenges and the World Bank: Hard*

- Questions, *Costly Choices* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.); Mosley, P. et al. (1991), *Aid and Power*; World Bank (1981), *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an Agenda for Action* (Washington DC: World Bank).
- 86 World Bank (1980), *World Development Report*, p. 138.
- 87 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 135.
- 88 Makin, J. (1984), *The Global Debt Crisis* (New York: Basic Books), pp. 14–15, 136.
- 89 Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power*, p. 561.
- 90 Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power*, pp. 570–2.
- 91 Rich, B. (1994), *Mortgaging the Earth: the World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development* (Boston: Beacon Press), pp. 99–100.
- 92 Forsythe, D. (1988), *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press), p. 183.
- 93 Senate Bill No. HR5262 (18/6/77), cited in Forsythe, D. (1988), *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy*, p. 30.
- 94 Forsythe, D. (1988), *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy*, p. 154.
- 95 Forsythe, D. (1988), *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy*, p. 60.
- 96 Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power*, pp. 572–3.
- 97 See Hogan, J. (1988), 'The Office of Management and Budget and Reaganomics: the Rise and Decline of a Presidential Staff Agency', in Lees, J. D. and Turner, M. (eds), *Reagan's First Four Years: a New Beginning?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 95–121.
- 98 Shapley, D. (1993), *Promise and Power*, pp. 578–9.
- 99 Stockman, D. (1986), *The Triumph of Politics: the Crisis in American Government and How it Affects the World* (Sevenoaks, Kent: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd.), p. 124.
- 100 McNamara, R. (1981), *The McNamara Years at the World Bank*, pp. 549, 602–3.
- 101 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 146.
- 102 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, pp. 140–4.
- 103 Cited in Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 200. Original: US Dept. of Treasury (1982), *United States Participation in the Multilateral Development Banks in the 1980s* (Washington DC: GPO).
- 104 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 200.
- 105 Cingranelli, D. (1993), *Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.), pp. 196–7.
- 106 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 204. As Caufield points out, this does not mean that it did not influence the Bank to make improper loans for political reasons. One example is a \$1.25 billion loan to Argentina, made in 1988, despite Bank staff objections to the country's fiscal policies. Secretary of State Baker, a close friend of Bank president Barber Conable, 'wanted to forestall social unrest in Latin America during the run-up to the US presidential election'. The Bank was forced to cancel the loan four months later when it proved unviable (p. 204).
- 107 Dickson, A. (1997), *Development and International Relations: a Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 141.

- 108 Ardito-Barletta, N. (1994), 'Managing Development and Transition', p. 175.
- 109 Caufield, C. (1996), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 144.
- 110 World Bank (1981), *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, pp. 121–2 (emphasis in original).
- 111 Gordon, D. (1992), 'Conditionality in Policy-Based Lending in Africa: USAID Experience', in Mosley, P. (ed.), *Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed Countries* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.), p. 30; Riddell, R. (1987), *Foreign Aid Reconsidered*. London: James Currey Ltd., p. 214.
- 112 Williams, M. (1994), *International Economic Organisations and the Third World* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf), p. 117.
- 113 World Bank (1997), *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 246.
- 114 World Bank (1997), *World Development Report*, pp. 246–7.
- 115 Jaycox, E. (1988), 'What Can Be Done in Africa? The World Bank's Response', in Commins, S. (ed.), *Africa's Development Challenges and the World Bank; Hard Questions, Costly Choices* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), p. 20.
- 116 Oxfam (1995), *A Case for Reform: Fifty Years of the IMF and the World Bank* (Oxford: Oxfam Publications), p. 9.
- 117 World Bank (1994), *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 7 (emphasis added).
- 118 World Bank (1992), *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 68–9.
- 119 The disappointing results for SAPs is only one important factor which should be taken into account to explain the poor performance of Sub-Saharan African countries. Other factors include the continuing weakening of primary commodity and agricultural prices, high population growth, lack of foreign investment and so on.
- 120 See, for example, Adepoju, A. (ed.) (1993), *The Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Population of Africa: the Implications for Education, Health and Employment* (London: James Currey Ltd.); Caffentzis, C. G. (1993), 'The Fundamental Implications of the Debt Crisis for Social Reproduction in Africa', in Dalla Costa, M. and Dalla Costa, G. (eds), *Paying the Price: Women and the Politics of International Economic Strategy* (London: Zed Books), pp. 15–41; Mehrotra, S. and Jolly, R. (eds) (1997), *Development with a Human Face: Experiences in Social Achievement and Economic Growth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Simon, D. (1995), 'Debt, Democracy and Development: Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s', in Simon, D. et al. (eds), *Structurally Adjusted Africa: Poverty, Debt and Basic Needs* (London: Pluto Press), pp. 17–44; Elson, D. (1991), 'Male Bias in Macro-economics: the Case of Structural Adjustment', in Elson, D. (ed.), *Male Bias in the Development Process* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 164–89; George, S. and Sabelli, F. (1994), *Faith and Credit: the World Bank's Secular Empire* (London: Penguin Books); Mosley, P. (ed.) (1992), *Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed Countries* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.); Bush, R. (1996), 'The Politics of Food and Starvation', *Review*

- of *African Political Economy*, 23 (68), pp. 169–95; Marquette, H. (1998), 'The Role of the World Bank in Promoting Sustainable Development through Family Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: a Critical Examination', unpublished MA dissertation, University of Durham, UK; Lugalla, J. (1995), 'The Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies on Women's and Children's Health in Tanzania', *Review of African Political Economy*, 22 (63), pp. 43–53.
- 121 Chen, L. and Desai, M. (1997), 'Paths to Social Development: Lessons from Case Studies', in Mehrotra, S. and Jolly, R. (eds), *Development with a Human Face* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 421–434.
- 122 Bello, W. (1994), *Dark Victory: the United States, Structural Adjustment, and Global Poverty* (London: Pluto Press), p. 5.
- 123 Chossudovsky, M. (1997), *The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms* (London: Zed Books), p. 76.
- 124 Ponte, S. (1994), 'The World Bank and "Adjustment in Africa"', *Review of African Political Economy*, 66, pp. 539–58.
- 125 Mosley, P. (1987), 'Conditionality as Bargaining Process: Structural Adjustment Lending, 1980–86', *Essays in International Finance*, No. 168, October, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 8–9, 21.
- 126 Mosley, P. (1987), 'Conditionality as Bargaining Process', p. 22. Mosley's overall point is supported by others; for example, Kahler, M. (1992). 'External Influence, Conditionality, and the Politics of Adjustment', in Haggard, S. and Kaufmann, R. (eds), *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 89–136.
- 127 For example, encouraging both Guinea and Brazil to increase their cocoa exports will only drive the price of cocoa down, reducing export earnings for both.
- 128 Bromley, S. (1995), 'Making Sense of Structural Adjustment', *Review of African Political Economy*, 65, p. 340 (emphasis in original).
- 129 Sender, J. and Smith, S. (1984), 'What's Right with the Berg Report and What's Left of its Critics?', IDS Discussion Paper, June, pp. 11–12.

### 3 The Path to the World Bank's Anti-Corruption Programme

- 1 Nherere, P. (1995), 'Conditionality, Human Rights and Good Governance: a Dialogue of Unequal Partners', in Ginther, K. et al. (eds), *Sustainable Development and Good Governance* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), p. 289.
- 2 Mosley, P. (1987), 'Conditionality as Bargaining Process: Structural Adjustment Lending, 1980–86', *Essays in International Finance*, No. 168, October Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 1.
- 3 Gordon, D. (1992), 'Conditionality in Policy-Based Lending in Africa: USAID Experience', in Mosley, P. (ed.), *Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed Countries* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.), p. 25.
- 4 Karl, T. and Schmitter, P. (1996), 'Democratization Around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks', in Jameson, K. and Wilber, C. (eds), *The*

- Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.), p. 175.
- 5 Hewitt, A. and Killick, T. (1996), 'Bilateral Aid Conditionality and Policy Leverage', in Stokke, O. (ed.), *Foreign Aid Towards the Year 2000: Experiences and Challenges* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.), p. 130.
  - 6 Robinson, M. (1993), 'Aid, Democratisation and Political Conditionality in Sub-Saharan Africa', in Sørensen, G. (ed.), *Political Conditionality* (London: Frank Cass), p. 90.
  - 7 Baylies, C. (1995), "'Political Conditionality" and Democratization', *Review of African Political Economy*, 65, p. 324.
  - 8 There is a significant body of scholarly literature on liberal democracy and on its link to development. Some works of note include Dahl, R. (1971), *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press); Schumpeter, J. (1976), *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.); Held, D. (1995), *Democracy and the Global Order* (Stanford: Stanford University Press); Held, D. (ed.) (1992), *Political Studies: Prospects for Democracy*, XL (Special Issue); Lipset, S. M. (1959), 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', *American Political Science Review*, 53 (1), pp. 69–105; Sandbrook, R. (1988), 'Liberal Democracy in Africa: a Socialist-Revisionist Perspective', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 22 (2), pp. 240–67; Sørensen, G. (1998), *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Boulder: Westview Press); Pinkney, R. (1993), *Democracy in the Third World* (Buckingham: Open University Press); Leftwich, A. (ed.) (1996), *Democracy and Development* (Cambridge: Polity Press); Potter, D. et al. (eds) (1997), *Democratization* (Milton Keynes: Open University); Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds) (1999), *Democratization in Africa* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press); Robinson, M. and White, G. (eds) (1998), *The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Ake, C. (1996), *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution).
  - 9 Sandbrook, R. (2000), *Closing the Circle: Democratisation and Development in Africa*. London: Zed Books Ltd., p. 2.
  - 10 Pye, L. (1990), 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', *American Political Science Review*, 84 (1), p. 17, note 4.
  - 11 Kausikan, B. (1997), 'Governance that Works', *Journal of Democracy*, 8 (2), p. 25.
  - 12 Cited in Maravall, J. M. (1994), 'The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage', *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (4), p. 18. Original: Kohli, A. (1986), 'Democracy and Development', in Lewis, J. and Kallab, V. (eds), *Development Strategies Reconsidered*, (Washington DC: Overseas Development Council), p. 156.
  - 13 Lipset, S. M. (1959), 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy', p. 79.
  - 14 Lipset, S. M. (1981), *Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics*, orig. 1959, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 31.
  - 15 Lipset explained that this is the 'capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the

- most appropriate or proper ones for the society'. Lipset, S. M. (1959), 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy', p. 86.
- 16 Lipset, S. M. (1959), 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy', pp. 79–86.
- 17 Lipset, S. M. (1959), 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy', p. 101. Interestingly, Lipset revisited his 1959 article in 1994 and reached similar conclusions. The 1994 article is more ideological though, with democracy clearly labelled 'desirable' and not just as the product of modernization. This perhaps reflects the changing orthodoxy of the times. Lipset, S. M. (1994). 'The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited', *American Sociological Review*, 59 (1), pp. 1–22.
- 18 Moore, B. Jr. (1966), *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books), pp. 413–14.
- 19 Rustow, D. (1967), *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution), p. 104.
- 20 Friedman, M. (1962) *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 10. Friedman here is arguing against socialism and not necessarily for democracy.
- 21 Huntington, S. (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 4. For a similar argument, see Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1995), 'Political Regimes and Economic Growth', in Bagchi, A. K. (ed.), *Democracy and Development: Proceedings of the IEA Conference held in Barcelona, Spain* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd./International Economic Association), p. 4.
- 22 Cited in Frohock, F. and Sylvan, D. (1983), 'Liberty, Economics and Evidence', *Political Studies*, 31 (4), p. 543. Original: Rawls, J. (1973) *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 542.
- 23 In this context, Cold War scholars made the distinction between capitalist/authoritarian regimes (that is, the South) and communist/totalitarian regimes (that is, the East). See Karl, T. and Schmitter, P. (1996), 'Democratization Around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks', in Jameson, K. and Wilber, C. (eds), *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill), pp. 170–1. This distinction is important in that the major proponents of this hypothesis came from the right. I am grateful to Dr Anna Dickson for this point.
- 24 Rao, V. (1984–5), 'Democracy and Economic Development', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 19 (4), pp. 67–81.
- 25 Lal, D. (1983) *The Poverty of 'Development Economics'*, Hobart Paperback No. 16 (London: Institute of Economic Affairs).
- 26 Lal, D. (1983), *The Poverty of 'Development Economics'*, p. 33.
- 27 Kant, I. (1891), *Kant's Principles of Politics including his Essay on Perpetual Peace*, orig. 1795, ed. and tr. by Hastie, W. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark).
- 28 See Doyle, M. (1983), 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12 (3), pp. 205–35; Doyle, M. (1983), 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12 (4), pp. 323–53; Doyle, M. (1986), 'Liberalism and World Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (4), pp. 1151–69; Oneal, J. and Russett, B. (1999), 'The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992', *World*

- Politics*, 52 (1), pp. 1–37; Weart, S. (1998), *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
- 29 Cited in Doyle, M. (1986), 'Liberalism and World Politics', p. 1151.
- 30 Cited in USAID (1999), *Center Report on Assistance for Democratic Development*, (Washington DC: USAID–CDG), p. 3.
- 31 Fukuyama, F. (1992), *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin Books). Based on his original article of 1989, 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, 16 (Summer), pp. 3–18.
- 32 For an interesting statistical analysis to show its empirical flaws, see Spiro, D. (1994), 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', *International Security*, 19 (2), pp. 50–86.
- 33 Zakaria, F. (1997), 'Illiberal Democracy', *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (6), p. 36. See also, Walt, S. (1999). 'Never Say Never: Wishful Thinking on Democracy and War', *Foreign Affairs*, 78 (1), pp. 146–51.
- 34 Layne, C. (1994), 'Kant or Cant: the Myth of the Democratic Peace', *International Security*, 19 (2), p. 40. To illustrate this point, Doyle disregards the War of 1812 because he only considers Britain a democracy from 1832, when suffrage was extended. However, *de facto* suffrage in the US at the time was no greater.
- 35 Layne, C. (1994), 'Kant or Cant', p. 5.
- 36 Walt, S. (1999). 'Never Say Never', p. 146.
- 37 O'Donnell writes of the 'overshadowing' of political scientists in this field by economists, 'often "leveraged" by jobs in international financial institutions', but clearly sees no problem with this situation, instead focusing his criticism on the lack of an effective typology of democracy for econometric research. O'Donnell, G. (1995), 'Do Economists Know Best?', *Journal of Democracy*, 6 (1), pp. 23–8.
- 38 Gillies, D. (1996), 'Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance: Stretching the World Bank's Policy Frontiers', in Griesgraber, J. and Gunter, B. (eds), *The World Bank: Lending on a Global Scale* (London: Pluto Press), pp. 109–10. This is despite the fact that the evidence from established democracies in the developing world, such as India and Jamaica, shows that democracy does not necessarily lead to popular participation. Socio-economic factors, such as wealth and education, are the big determining factors. See Robinson, M. (1998). 'Democracy, Participation, and Public Policy: the Politics of Institutional Design', in Robinson, M. and White, G. (eds), *The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 180–91.
- 39 A comparison could be drawn between this work by economists trying to prove that democracy is indeed good for economic growth and work done by biblical archaeologists who use the Bible to interpret findings, rather than the other way around, as is the norm.
- 40 World Bank (1991), *World Development Report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 4.
- 41 Klitgaard, R. (1994), 'Do Better Polities Have Higher Economic Growth?', IRIS Working Paper No. 113, June, p. 6. The data Klitgaard uses are found in Scully, G. (1992), *Constitutional Environments and Economic Growth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 176.

- 42 Klitgaard, R. (1994), 'Do Better Polities Have Higher Economic Growth?', p. 8.
- 43 Knack and Keefer both work in the World Bank's research department. See Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997), 'Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation', *Economic Inquiry*, 35 (July), pp. 590–602; Keefer, P. (1993), 'Checks and Balances, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development', IRIS Working Paper No. 29 (College Park, MD: IRIS); Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995), 'Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures', *Economics and Politics*, 7 (3), pp. 207–27; Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997), 'Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Country Investigation', IRIS Working Paper No. 197 (College Park, MD: IRIS).
- 44 Measures of freedom include banking and finance, capital flows and foreign investment, monetary policy, the fiscal burden of government, trade policy, wages and prices, government intervention in the economy, property rights, regulation and black markets.
- 45 Driscoll, G. Jr., Holmes, K. and Kirkpatrick, M. (2000), 'Who's Free, Who's Not: the Difference between Prosperity and Poverty is Liberty', *Wall Street Journal*, 1 November. See also, Heritage Foundation (2000), 'Global Economic Freedom Continues to Gain, Survey Shows', *The Heritage Foundation News*, 1 November; Driscoll, G. Jr., Holmes, K. and Kirkpatrick, M. (2000), *2001 Index of Economic Freedom* (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation & the Wall Street Journal).
- 46 Bardhan, P. (1990), 'Symposium on the State and Economic Development', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 4 (3), p. 5.
- 47 See Weber, M. (1964), *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*, tr. by Henderson, A. M. and Parsons, T. (New York: Free Press). Ironically, Weber said, 'It is completely ridiculous to attribute to today's advanced capitalism an elective affinity with "democracy" not to mention "freedom" (in any meaning of the word).' Cited in Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. and Stephens, J. (1992), *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 21. Original: Weber, M. (1906), 'Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Russland', *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, NS 22, p. 347.
- 48 Sørensen, G. (1991), *Democracy, Dictatorship and Development: Economic Development in Selected Regimes of the Third World* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.), pp. 66–7.
- 49 World Bank (1991), *World Development Report*, pp. 9–10.
- 50 Maravall, J. M. (1994), 'The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage', p. 19.
- 51 Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A. and Limongi, F. (2000), *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 18.
- 52 Przeworski, A. et al. (2000), *Democracy and Development*, p. 106.
- 53 Clearly there are pre-existing moral judgements at work here about the value of democracy itself. Przeworski, A. et al. (2000), *Democracy and Development*, pp. 178, 271.
- 54 Cited in Przeworski, A. et al. (2000), *Democracy and Development*, p. 210. Original: Marx, K. (1952), *The Class Struggle in France, 1848 to 1850*



- (Moscow: Progress Publishers), p. 62. In a different text, Przeworski also contradicts Marx's theory on the Bonapartist dictatorship, arguing instead that in capitalist democracies, democracy protects capitalists' interests through participation. Przeworski, A. (1985), *Capitalism and Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 142–3. See Marx, K. (1934), *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Moscow: Progress Publishers).
- 55 Przeworski, A. et al. (2000), *Democracy and Development*, p. 211.
- 56 The use of 'well-being' rather than economic growth is of great significance. Traditionally, development has been measured in terms of economic growth, but a growing number of scholars argue that economic growth is not sufficient because it does not measure factors such as income distribution. This argument culminated in the annual publication of the UN's Human Development Index, which measures growth, in addition to factors such as literacy and infant mortality rates. Although there is a great deal to be said for this alternative view of development, the World Bank sticks to the orthodox measurements of growth and only pays lip service to this notion of 'well-being'.
- 57 For example, if China's total income in 1998 was \$928.9 billion and Ireland's total income was \$67.5 billion, it appears that China is significantly wealthier than Ireland. However, with a Chinese population totalling over 1.2 billion and an Irish population of only 4 million, per capita incomes are \$750 and \$18 340, respectively, telling a different story entirely. I am grateful to Dr Mark Aspinwall for clarification here. Income figures from World Bank (2000), *World Development Report 1999/2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 230–1.
- 58 Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1995). 'Political Regimes and Economic Growth', pp. 11–12. One can only guess at how the authors' views changed so dramatically from 1995 to 2000.
- 59 White, G. (1998), 'Constructing a Democratic Developmental State', in Robinson, M. and White, G. (eds), *The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 22.
- 60 Dick, G. W. (1974), 'Authoritarian versus Non-authoritarian Approaches to Economic Development', *Journal of Political Economy*, 82 (4), pp. 822–3.
- 61 Dasgupta, P. (1993), *An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- 62 The basic assumption that underpins the Bank's work is that economic growth is essential for development, and has been held by the Bank since its inception, despite various manifestations within its development philosophy. Despite recent in-house criticism of this approach, as well as extensive outside criticism, the Bank stands by the assumption that growth is essential for development.
- 63 A clear example of this is Ake, who presents a paradigm of development in which development equals human well-being, rather than economic growth, and in which democracy is vital for human well-being. See Ake, C. (1996), *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution), especially Chapter 5. Dasgupta's argument is similar.

- 64 Diamond, L. (1992), 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 36 (4/5), p. 460.
- 65 Diamond, L. (1992), 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', p. 486.
- 66 He refers here to the landmark study by Almond and Verba. See Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1963), *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- 67 Diamond, L. (1992), 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', p. 487.
- 68 Diamond, L. (1992), 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', p. 488.
- 69 Leftwich, A. (1996), 'On the Primacy of Politics in Development', in Leftwich, A. (ed.), *Democracy and Development* (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 4.
- 70 Saul, J. (1997). "For Fear of Being Condemned as Old Fashioned": Liberal Democracy vs. Popular Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 24 (73), p. 341.
- 71 Dickson, A. (1997), *Development and International Relations: a Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 140. Leftwich adds to this first list: Malaysia, Botswana, Taiwan, China and Thailand.
- 72 There is not room here for an in-depth treatment of the NIC paradox, but excellent discussions can be found in Haggard, S. (1990), *Pathways from the Periphery: the Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrialising Countries* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); Moran, J. (1999), 'Patterns of Corruption and Development in East Asia', *Third World Quarterly*, 20 (3), pp. 569–87; Moon, C. and Kim, Y. (1996), 'A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics and Democracy in South Korea' in Leftwich, A. (ed.), *Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 137–67; Gills, B. (1993), 'Korean Capitalism and Democracy' in Gills, B., Rocamora, J. and Willson, R. (eds), *Low-Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order* (London: Pluto Press), pp. 226–57. Prior to the late 1990s' financial crisis, the World Bank argued that developing countries should model themselves on the East Asian model. See World Bank (1993), *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). The financial crisis changed this, which the Bank blamed, in part, on an invasive and corrupt state. See, for example, Claessens, C. and Glaessner, T. (1997), *Are Financial Sector Weaknesses Undermining the East Asian Miracle?* (Washington DC: World Bank).
- 73 Haggard, S. (1990), *Pathways from the Periphery*, pp. 255–6.
- 74 Cited in Doig, A. (2000), 'In the State We Trust? Democratisation, Corruption and Development', in Doig, A. and Theobald, R. (eds), *Corruption and Democratisation* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.), p. 13. Original: Sandbrook, R. and Oelbaum, J. (1997), 'Reforming Dysfunctional Institutions Through Democratisation? Reflections on Ghana', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35 (4), p. 608.
- 75 Wintrobe, R. (1998), *The Political Economy of Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 128.
- 76 Johnson, C. (1982), *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. vii.

- 77 Leftwich, A. (1996), 'Two Cheers for Democracy? Democracy and the Developmental State', in Leftwich, A. (ed.), *Democracy and Development* (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 284.
- 78 Leftwich, A. (1994), 'Governance, the State and the Politics of Development', *Development & Change*, 25 (2), pp. 377–81.
- 79 White, G. (1984), 'Developmental States and Socialist Industrialization in the Third World', *Journal of Development Studies*. 21 (1), pp. 98–101.
- 80 Huntington, S. (1987), 'The Goals of Development', in Weiner, M. and Huntington, S. (eds), *Understanding Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown), pp. 25–6.
- 81 White, G. (1998), 'Constructing a Democratic Developmental State', p. 29.
- 82 Sørensen, G. (1991), *Democracy, Dictatorship and Development*, p. 184.
- 83 Wintrobe, R. (1998), *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*, pp. 7–14.
- 84 Wintrobe, R. (1998), *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*, p. 149 (emphasis in original).
- 85 Leftwich, A. (1994), 'Governance, the State and the Politics of Development', p. 365.
- 86 White, G. (1998), 'Constructing a Democratic Developmental State', pp. 23, 42.
- 87 White, G. (1998), 'Constructing a Democratic Developmental State', p. 24.
- 88 Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. and Stephens, J. (1992), *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, pp. 5, 302. See also, Huber, E., Rueschemeyer, D. and Stephens, J. (1993), 'The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 7 (3), pp. 71–86.
- 89 Healey, J. and Robinson, M. (1992), *Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective*, (London: Overseas Development Institute), p. 122.
- 90 Healey, J. and Robinson, M. (1992), *Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy*, p. 124.
- 91 Roemer, J. (1995), 'On the Relationship between Economic Development and Political Development', in Baguhi, A. K. (ed.), *Democracy and Development: Proceedings of the IEA Conference held in Barcelona, Spain* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd./International Economic Association), p. 53.
- 92 Robinson, M. (1993), 'Aid, Democratisation and Political Conditionality in Sub-Saharan Africa', pp. 90–1.
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- 94 Cassen, R. (1994), *Does Aid Work?*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 59.
- 95 Nelson, J. (1992), 'Good Governance', p. 315.
- 96 Here Collier is referring to the economic conditions of SAPs, but he transfers this same reasoning to his more recent forays into political conditions, especially for anti-corruption work.

- 97 He defines an 'agency of restraint' as 'the institutional arrangement whereby a government locks itself into a policy'. Collier, P. (1999), 'Learning from Failure: the International Financial Institutions as Agencies of Restraint in Africa', in Schedler, A., Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. et al (eds), *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 314.
- 98 Collier, P. (1999), 'Learning from Failure', pp. 314–15.
- 99 Collier, P. (1999), 'Learning from Failure', p. 316–17.
- 100 Baylies, C. (1995), "'Political Conditionality" and Democratization', p. 325.
- 101 Nelson, J. (1992), 'Good Governance', p. 312.
- 102 Baylies, C. (1995), "'Political Conditionality" and Democratization', p. 324.
- 103 In his 1980 inaugural address, Reagan famously said, "'Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem'", quoted in Hogan, J. (1988), 'The Office of Management and Budget and Reaganomics', pp. 97–8.
- 104 World Bank (1997), *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. iii.
- 105 Cassen, R. (1994), *Does Aid Work?*, pp. 82–3.
- 106 Burnell, P. (1993), "'Good Government" and Foreign Aid', PAIS Working Paper No. 115, University of Warwick, January, pp. 10–11.
- 107 Collier, P. (1999), 'Learning from Failure', p. 323.
- 108 Culpepper, R. (1996), 'Multilateral Development Banks: Toward a New Division of Labour', in Griesgraber, J. and Gunter, B. (eds), *Development: New Paradigms and Principles for the Twenty-first Century* (London: Pluto Press), p. 65; see also Gordon, D. (1992), 'Conditionality in Policy-Based Lending in Africa: USAID Experience', in Mosley, P. (ed.), *Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed Countries* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.), pp. 25–53.
- 109 Ardito-Barletta, N. (1994), 'Managing Development and Transition', in Kenen, P. (ed.), *Managing the World Economy Fifty Years After Bretton Woods* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics), p. 197. This seems unlikely that this is a real concern for the Bank, considering the attention being paid to the issue by all major donor organizations, NGOs, the United Nations and the world's media.
- 110 ul Haq, M. (1994), 'The Bretton Woods Institutions and Global Governance', in Kenen, P. (ed.), *Managing the World Economy Fifty Years After Bretton Woods* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics), p. 411.
- 111 Huntington, S. (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press).
- 112 Hewitt, A. and Killick, T. (1996), 'Bilateral Aid Conditionality and Policy Leverage', p. 136.
- 113 Ben-Dor, G. (1974), 'Corruption, Institutionalization, and Political Development', *Comparative Political Studies*, 7 (1), p. 69.
- 114 Heidenheimer, A. (ed.) (1970), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 480–1;

- Ben-Dor, G. (1974), 'Corruption, Institutionalization, and Political Development', p. 65.
- 115 Leys, C. (1970), 'What is the Problem about Corruption?', in Heidenheimer, A. (ed.), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p. 36. Originally appeared under the same title in 1965, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3 (2), pp. 215–24. Leff, N. (1970), 'Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption', in Heidenheimer, A. (ed.), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p. 510. Originally appeared under the same title in 1964, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 8 (3), pp. 8–14. The authors were quick to point out that 'can' is not the same as 'will'.
- 116 However, it is important to note that this is only the case if the money ends up in capital investment and not in Swiss bank accounts.
- 117 Leys, C. (1970), 'What is the Problem About Corruption?', p. 36.
- 118 Leys, C. (1970), 'What is the Problem About Corruption?', p. 36, note 26. See also Nye's point on corruption's beneficial impact on the integration of non-elites. Nye, J. S. (1970), 'Corruption and Political Development: a Cost-Benefit Analysis', in Heidenheimer, A. (ed.), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. 568–9. Originally appeared under the same title in 1967, *American Political Science Review*, 61 (2), pp. 417–27.
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- 120 Nye, J. S. (1970). 'Corruption and Political Development: a Cost-Benefit Analysis', pp. 567–8.
- 121 Interestingly, as early as 1967, Nye wrote, 'If corruption is a consideration with donors (presumably it weighs more heavily with multilateral institutions), it is not yet a primary one.' Nye, J. S. (1970), 'Corruption and Political Development', p. 570. Nye did not explain his presumption, but it does at least indicate an early academic concern with corruption and the World Bank.
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- 123 Scott, J. C. (1969). 'The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations'. *Comparative Studies in Society & History*. 11(2), pp. 324–325.
- 124 Scott, J. C. (1969), 'The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations', pp. 326–7; Scott, J. C. (1970), 'Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change', in Heidenheimer, A. (ed.), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p. 549. Originally appeared in 1969, 'Corruption, Machine Politics, and Social Change', *American Political Science Review*, 63 (4), pp. 1142–59. See also, Scott, J. C. (1972), *Comparative Political Corruption*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall).
- 125 Huntington, S. (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 69.
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- Originally appeared under the same title in 1968, *Asian Drama: an Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations (Vol. II)* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books), pp. 951–8.
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- 129 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 2.
- 130 Krueger, A. (1974), 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', p. 295.
- 131 Myrdal, G. (1970), 'Corruption', p. 541.
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- 134 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978), *Corruption: a Study in Political Economy* (New York: Academic Press).
- 135 Klitgaard, R. (1988), *Controlling Corruption* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- 136 Klitgaard has worked as a consultant to the Bank on corruption, while Rose-Ackerman was also a visiting scholar at the Bank in the mid-1990s. While working as a visiting scholar at the World Bank, Rose-Ackerman published the following papers: (1996), 'The Political Economy of Corruption – Causes and Consequences', Public Policy for the Private Sector Note No. 74 (Washington DC: World Bank); (1996), 'Redesigning the State to Fight Corruption'. Viewpoint Note No. 75 (Washington DC: World Bank); (1996), 'Democracy and "Grand" Corruption', *International Social Science Journal*, 48, pp. 365–80; (1996), 'Is Leaner Government Cleaner Government?', published in Spanish as '¿Una Administración Reducida Significa una Administración Mas Limpia?', *Nueva Sociedad*. 145 (Sept-Oct), pp. 66–79; with Coolidge, J. (1997), 'High-Level Rent-Seeking and Corruption in African Regimes', Policy Research Working Paper No. 1780 (Washington DC: World Bank); (1997), 'When is Corruption Harmful?', background paper for 1997 WDR (Washington DC: World Bank); (1997), 'Corruption, Inefficiency and Economic Growth', *Nordic Journal of Political Economy*, 24, pp. 3–20; (1997), 'The Political Economy of Corruption', in Elliot, K. (ed.), *Corruption and the Global Economy* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics), pp. 31–60; (1997), 'The Role of the World Bank in Controlling Corruption', *Law & Policy in International Business*, 29 (1), pp. 93–114; with Stone, A. (1998), 'The Burden of Bribery on Private Business: Evidence from World Bank Surveys', draft working paper (Washington DC: World Bank); (1998), 'Corruption and Development', in Pleskovic, B. and Stiglitz, J. (eds), *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 1997* (Washington DC: World Bank), pp. 35–57.
- 137 Klitgaard, R. (1988), *Controlling Corruption*, p. 22.

- 138 Klitgaard, R. (1988), *Controlling Corruption*, p. 24; see also, Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978), *Corruption*, p. 9.
- 139 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978), *Corruption*, p. 9 (emphasis in original).
- 140 Ostensible involves determining the treatment while strategic involves how to get it implemented.
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- 143 UNDP (2002), *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 51.
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- 145 Johnston, M. (2000), ‘Corruption and Democracy: Threats to Development, Opportunities for Reform’. Colgate University, mimeo, p. 19.
- 146 Johnston, M. (2000), ‘Corruption and Democracy’, pp. 20–1.
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- 148 World Bank (2001), *World Development Report 2002* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- 149 World Bank (2001), *World Development Report 2002*, p. 108.
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- 151 See, for example, Pharr, S. and Putnam, R. (2000), *Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- 152 Cited in Zakaria, F. (1997), ‘Illiberal Democracy’, *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (6), pp. 22–43.
- 153 Huntington, S. (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 59.
- 154 Huntington, S. (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 59–61.
- 155 Huntington, S. (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 62.
- 156 Veloso Abueva, J. (1970), ‘The Contributions of Nepotism, Spoils and Graft to Political Development’, in Heidenheimer, A. (ed.), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books), pp. 534–9. Original: (1966), ‘The Contributions of Nepotism, Spoils and Graft to Political Development’, *East-West Center Review*, 3, pp. 45–54.
- 157 Khan, M. (1998), ‘Patron-Client Networks and the Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia’, in Robinson, M. (ed.), *Corruption and Development* (London: Frank Cass), pp. 32–5.
- 158 Scott wrote about machine building and corruption in the United States and drew conclusions for developing countries, based on this experience, which saw the machine ‘fashion a cacophony of concrete, parochial demands in immigrant-choked cities into a system of rule that was at once reasonably effective and legitimate’ (p. 550). The ‘machine’ is a way of organizing voters through a system of exchanging votes for influence and material rewards, with a ‘boss’ and loyal followers. See Scott, J. C. (1970), ‘Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change’, in Heidenheimer, A. (ed.), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. 549–63. Original: Scott, J. C. (1969), ‘Corruption,

- Machine Politics, and Social Change', *American Political Science Review*, 63 (4), pp. 1142–59.
- 159 Perkins, D. (2000), 'When is Political Corruption Good for Democracy? A Comparative Analysis of Political Machines', paper presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, 31 August – 3 September, p. 21.
- 160 Perkins, D. (2000), 'When is Political Corruption Good for Democracy?', p. 3.
- 161 Portes, A. (1998) 'Social Capital: its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24, pp. 1–24.
- 162 Warren, M. (2001), 'Social Capital and Corruption', Georgetown University, mimeo, p. 8.
- 163 Warren, M. (2001), 'Social Capital and Corruption', p. 2.
- 164 Moran, J. (2001), 'Democratic Transitions and Forms of Corruption', *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 36 (4), pp. 381–3.
- 165 Moran, J. (2001), 'Democratic Transitions and Forms of Corruption', p. 383.
- 166 Moran, J. (2001), 'Democratic Transitions and Forms of Corruption', pp. 383–6.
- 167 Moran, J. (2001), 'Democratic Transitions and Forms of Corruption', pp. 388–9.
- 168 Moran, J. (2001), 'Democratic Transitions and Forms of Corruption', p. 389.
- 169 Harriss-White, B. and White, G. (1996), 'Corruption, Liberalisation and Democracy', *IDS Bulletin*, 27 (2), p. 3.
- 170 Whitehead, L. (2002), *Democratization: Theory and Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 118.
- 171 Whitehead, L. (2002), *Democratization*, pp. 118–19.
- 172 Schumpeter, J. (1942), *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- 173 Downs, A. (1957), *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers).
- 174 Ball, T. (1988), *Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Critical Conceptual History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 122. Both Klitgaard and Rose-Ackerman are proponents of rational choice theories of corruption.
- 175 Ball, T. (1988), *Transforming Political Discourse*, p. 136. An interesting example of this is found in a paper by Klitgaard, in which he includes an anecdote about meeting Raymond Gastil, author of *Freedom in the World*, who expressed displeasure that his index of political and civil rights was being linked to economic growth in Klitgaard's work. Klitgaard says that he tried to explain the methodology to Gastil but he did not seem to understand. With the tone in which Klitgaard recounts this story, one can almost imagine a wink at his fellow economists. Klitgaard, R. (1994), 'Do Better Polities Have Higher Economic Growth?', IRIS Working Paper No. 113, p. 5.
- 176 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption: the Role of the World Bank* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 8 (emphasis in original). For an excellent approach to the problems of defining corruption, see Philp, M. (1997), 'Defining Political Corruption', *Political Studies: Special Issue – Political Corruption*, 45 (3), pp. 436–62. In the most recent World



- Development Report, the Bank refers to its definition as 'the classic definition of corruption'. World Bank (2001), *World Development Report 2002* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 101. The Bank should perhaps draw a distinction between 'often-cited' and 'classic.'
- 177 Sørensen, G. (1998), *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World* (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 12–13.; see also, Dahl, R. (1971), *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
- 178 For example, Singapore is not a liberal democracy but has low levels of corruption, partly as a result of its successful Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), established in 1952.
- 179 World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 1.
- 180 UNDP (1997), *Corruption and Good Governance* (New York: UNDP), p. v.
- 181 USAID (1996), 'USAID's Strategies for Sustainable Development: Building Democracy', available at <http://www.info.usaid.gov/democracy/strategy.htm>.
- 182 Chaulker, L. (1991), 'Good Government and the Aid Programme', speech given at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 25 June.
- 183 DfID (2000), 'Governance Department', available at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk>.
- 184 EU (1989), 'Fourth Lomé Convention', Document 291A0817(01), available at [http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1991/en\\_291A0817\\_01.html](http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1991/en_291A0817_01.html). The EU has taken the longest of all major donors to articulate a cohesive governance agenda, but this reflects the uniqueness of its aid programme and its relationship with the majority of LDCs through Lomé. A recent article by Dickson shows how human rights and democracy have crept into the EU's agenda with its ACP partners. Dickson, A. (2000), 'Bridging the Gap: Great Expectations for EU Development Co-operation Policies', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 9 (3), pp. 275–96. Refer also to specific articles in *The Courier*, including 'Memorandum on the Community's Development Policy', *The Courier*, No. 76, November–December 1982, pp. 48–74; 'Negotiations Diary', *The Courier*, No. 83, January–February 1984, pp. i–xvi; 'Brussels – Second Ministerial Meeting in the ACP–EEC Negotiations', *The Courier*, No. 84, March–April 1984, pp. i–xxii; 'Negotiations Update', *The Courier*, No. 85, May–June 1984, pp. i–xii.
- 185 DANIDA (1997), *Denmark's Development Assistance 1996* (Copenhagen: DANIDA); see also, Marquette, H. (1999), 'Selected European Countries' Approaches to Development and Good Governance', briefing paper for DfID, mimeo.
- 186 Many other factors also affect the Bank's decision, such as the nature of the projects, and so on, but restrictions of space and time preclude a discussion.
- 187 In 2000, IBRD disbursed \$10.9 billion, with Sub-Saharan Africa receiving only 1 per cent of that total, while IDA disbursed \$4.4 billion, with 47 per cent going to Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank (2000), *World Bank Annual Report 2000* (Washington DC: World Bank), pp. 9–10. The Bank also lends comparatively little to the Middle East, where demand for

- Bank loans has historically been very low and bilateral funding is plentiful.
- 188 World Bank figures for Europe include Central Asia and cannot be separated out of the total.
- 189 World Bank (1981), *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an Agenda for Action* (Washington DC: World Bank), pp. 40–41.
- 190 World Bank (1983), *World Development Report 1983* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- 191 World Bank (1983), *World Development Report 1983*, pp. 5–6.
- 192 World Bank (1983), *World Development Report 1983*, p. 94.
- 193 World Bank (1983), *World Development Report 1983*, p. 117.
- 194 World Bank (1983), *World Development Report 1983*, p. 116.
- 195 World Bank (1983), *World Development Report 1983*, p. 95.
- 196 World Bank (1987), *World Development Report 1987* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 75.
- 197 World Bank (1990), *The World Bank Annual Report 1990* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 89; World Bank (1991), *The World Bank Annual Report 1991* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 68.
- 198 World Bank (1991), *The World Bank Annual Report 1991*, p. 4.
- 199 World Bank (1991), *The World Bank Annual Report 1991*, pp. 9–10. The Bank refers here to work by R. Gastil (1989), *Freedom in the World* (New York: Freedom House), published annually since 1978.
- 200 Miller-Adams, M. (1999), *The World Bank: New Agendas in a Changing World* (London: Routledge), p. 111. See also, World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development*, p. 58, note 2; Agarwala, R. and Schwartz, P. (1994), 'Sub-Saharan Africa: a Long-Term Perspective Study', paper prepared for the World Bank Workshop on Participatory Development, 17–20 May 1994.
- 201 World Bank (1989), *Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth (A Long-Term Perspective Study)* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 60. The background papers for this report have also been published and volume 3 is especially relevant. See World Bank (1990), *The Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa, Volume 3: Institutional and Socio-political Issues* (Washington DC: World Bank), especially the contributions by Tarr, B., 'Political Developments and Environment in Africa', pp. 32–42; Hyden, G., 'The Changing Context of Institutional Development in Sub-Saharan Africa', pp. 43–59; and Hyden, G. 'Creating an Enabling Environment', pp. 73–80.
- 202 World Bank (1989), *Sub-Saharan Africa*, pp. 5, 55.
- 203 The ACBI, now known as the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), originated from a World Bank-convened meeting in Kenya between Bank staff and African policy-makers, economic managers and academics in 1988. The meeting established a lack of capacity as the main reason for continuing African underdevelopment. Results were presented to donors at the Rockefeller Foundation in New York in 1989. Working with the African Development Bank (AfDB), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other donors, the Bank launched ACBF in 1992 (see <http://www.acbf-pact.org>). In 1997, Wolfensohn announced that 'efforts are now underway to establish both an international consultative

group for capacity building in Africa and an accompanying trust fund', as outlined in a report by the African Governors of the World Bank entitled 'Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa: Strategy and Program of Action'. World Bank (1997), 'Bank Embraces New Push for Capacity Building in Africa', *World Bank News*, 9 May. The Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa (PACT), established in January 2000, focuses on building capacity in the public and private sectors, as well as civil society, and supporting regional research and training. The Bank has provided a \$30 million grant, with a further \$150 million awaiting Board approval, and a total initial pledge from donors of \$1 billion. See <http://www.acbf-pact.org>; World Bank (2000), *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: a World Bank Strategy* (Washington DC: World Bank), pp. 75–6, 84. PACT is fully implemented by ACBF and not by the AFR region of the Bank. Instead, a representative from the Bank sits on ACBF's Board. Although PACT is held up by the Bank as an 'African-owned initiative', with twelve Africans on the twenty-two-member Board (the rest are donors), it is hard to see any instance in its history where the Bank has not been at the forefront of initiatives.

- 204 World Bank (1989), *Sub-Saharan Africa*, p. 60.
- 205 Shihata, I. (1991), *The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), p. 40.
- 206 However, 'a question which is traditionally considered as "political" cannot be turned into an economic issue just because of minor possible economic effects'. Shihata, I. (1991), *The World Bank in a Changing World*, p. 84. Despite this, 'Much of what the Bank now considers "economic", and therefore appropriate for its attention, would even a decade ago have been considered inappropriate.' Blackden, C. M. (1996), 'Human Rights, Development, and the World Bank: Economics vs. Politics?', *Dialogue*, April, p. 3.
- 207 Shihata, I. (1991), *The World Bank in a Changing World*, pp. 82–4; see also World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 5.
- 208 Shihata, I. (1991), *The World Bank in a Changing World*, pp. 88–93.
- 209 Landell-Mills, P. and Serageldin, I. (1992), 'Governance and the External Factor', Proceedings of the 1991 World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, p. 304. This same paper includes the caveat that external agencies, such as the World Bank, should not impose 'a particular democratic system' on a country, but should consider withdrawing funding unless there is at least 'some minimal level of popular support' for the government (pp. 311–12). This caveat contains the *a priori* assumption that the political system in question is democratic, and does not take into consideration that almost all governments, with rare exceptions, have at least 'some minimal level of popular support'. This includes governments that wholly contradict the Bank's notion of good governance: Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Castro in Cuba and even the Taliban in Afghanistan.
- 210 Phillip, B. (1997), 'The World Bank and Governance', p. 58.
- 211 World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development*, p. 1.

- 212 World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development*, p. 1.
- 213 World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development*, p. 2.
- 214 World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development*, p. xv.
- 215 World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development*, p. 2.
- 216 World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development*, p. 3.
- 217 World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development*, p. 4.
- 218 She defines formal aspects as including institutions and processes, while material aspects includes strategies that are market-friendly, socially considerate and culturally sensitive. Schlemmer-Schulte, S. (2001), 'The World Bank's Role in the Promotion of the Rule of Law in Developing Countries', in Schlemmer-Schulte, S. and Tung, K. (eds), *Liber Amicorum Ibrahim F.I. Shihata: International Finance and Development Law* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), p. 722.
- 219 World Bank (1992), *Governance and Development*, p. 1.
- 220 Adamolekun, L. (1990), 'Institutional Perspectives on Africa's Development Crisis', *African Governance in the 1990s: Objectives, Resources and Constraints*, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Annual Seminar of the African Governance Program, The Carter Center, Atlanta, 23–25 March, p. 82, note 5.
- 221 World Bank (2000) *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: a World Bank Strategy* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 152.
- 222 World Bank (1988), *Adjustment Lending* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 3, cited in Callaghy, T. (1990), 'Lost Between State and Market: the Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria', in Nelson, J. (ed.), *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: the Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 318 (emphasis added by Callaghy).
- 223 Abrahamsen, R. (2000), *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* (London: Zed Books), p. 42.
- 224 Martin, B. (2000), *New Leaf or Figleaf? The Challenges of the New Washington Consensus* (London: Bretton Woods Project & Public Services International).
- 225 George, S. and Sabelli, F. (1994), *Faith and Credit: the World Bank's Secular Empire* (London: Penguin Books), p. 142.
- 226 Manor, J. (1998), 'Democratisation and the Developmental State: the Search for Balance', in Robinson, M. and White, G. (eds), *The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 129.
- 227 Parekh, B. (1992), 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy', *Political Studies/Special Issue: Prospects for Democracy*, 40, p. 173 (emphasis in original).
- 228 Leftwich, A. (2000), *States of Development: On the Primacy of Politics in Development* (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 129.
- 229 Interview with senior World Bank staff member.
- 230 Bottelier, P. (1998), 'Corruption and Development', remarks for the International Symposium on the Prevention and Control of Financial Fraud, Beijing, 19 October, p. 1. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/eap/pbsp101998.htm>.
- 231 Gould, D. and Amaro-Reyes, J. (1983), 'The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance: Illustrations from Developing Countries',

- World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 580, October (Washington DC: World Bank). This publication contains a forward by Pierre Landell-Mills, another Bank specialist on corruption, who commissioned the paper as background material for the 1983 *World Development Report*, which Landell-Mills directed.
- 232 Gould, D. and Amaro-Reyes, J. (1983), 'The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance', pp. 15, 17.
- 233 Gould, D. and Amaro-Reyes, J. (1983), 'The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance', p. 2.
- 234 In addition to his own work, cited throughout this chapter, the significance of his role is highlighted in Schlemmer-Schulte, S. and Tung, K. (eds) (2001), *Liber Amicorum Ibrahim F.I. Shihata: International Finance and Development Law*.
- 235 Now known as the World Bank Institute (WBI), as a result of a recent merger between the Learning and Leadership Centre, which provided training for staff, and EDI, which provided training for clients.
- 236 Adamolekun, L. and Shields, E. (1990), 'Civil Service Improvement', *EDI Review*, July, p. 5.
- 237 The SDS is used to measure sectoral performance by surveying both users and suppliers of public services in order to improve results and capacity. See Langseth, P. (1995), 'Service Delivery Survey (SDS): a Diagnostic Tool', paper presented at the Workshop on Civil Service Reform in Anglophone Africa, Somerset West, South Africa, 24–28 April.
- 238 Langseth, P. (1997), 'EDI's New Approach to Governance: Principles and Modus Operandi for EDI's Governance Work', in Kpundeh, S. and Langseth, P. (eds), *Good Governance for Private Sector Development and Investment in Africa: a Regional Ministerial Seminar*, Entebbe, Uganda, 16–19 March, p. 14 (emphasis in original).
- 239 In this case, Transparency International. Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999), 'The Global Coalition Against Corruption: Evaluating Transparency International', in Schedler, A., Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. et al. (eds), *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 266.
- 240 This could provide one explanation for why the Bank's current work on corruption is so much more advanced in Uganda than in many other African countries.
- 241 The bulk of this section is drawn from Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999), 'The Global Coalition Against Corruption', pp. 257–82. The reason for this is quite simple – there is no other large-scale study of the organization, despite the important role it has played in bringing international attention to corruption. Work that has been done tends to focus solely on the CPI and its methodology. One exception, cited within Galtung and Pope, is a 1996 piece by Espinosa, entitled 'Corrupción: una agenda necesaria', in Espinosa, S. (ed.), *Corrupción: Epidemia de fin de siglo* (Quinto: ILDIS, Cedep, & Fundación J. Peralta), pp. 77–93. He is quoted in Galtung and Pope as saying that TI is

hija legítima de padre neoliberal y de madre modernizadora tanto porque la transparencia es una condición de credibilidad para el

proceso privatizador, para la inversión extranjera y para la ayuda internacional al desarrollo, como porque los neoliberales han hecho de la afinidad y mutua apatencia entre Estado omnipotente y corrupción un eficaz instrumento de propaganda sobre la necesidad de reducir el tamaño del estado. (Espinosa, p. 82; cited in Galtung and Pope, note 13, p. 280)

Roughly translated, Espinosa says that TI is ‘the legitimate daughter of the neoliberal father and modernization mother, so much because transparency is a condition of credibility for the privatization process, for external influence and for international aid for development; also because the neoliberals have made an affinity and mutual link between the omnipotent State and corruption an efficient instrument of propaganda about the necessity to reduce the size of the state’. Galtung and Pope offer no further analysis on this quite stark observation on Espinosa’s part.

242 Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999), ‘The Global Coalition Against Corruption’, pp. 257–8.

243 Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999), ‘The Global Coalition Against Corruption’, p. 258. In a footnote to the above passage, Galtung and Pope write:

The prohibition against taking political considerations into account in lending decisions was clearly designed to provide protection for countries with one-party state systems of government – monarchies and the like – and to prevent discrimination on constitutional grounds. In our view, it cannot reasonably be read as excluding the Bank from taking into account the likelihood that elites would loot the treasury and distort public decisions, leaving the people of the country to meet the costs. We see their view as substantiated by the Bank’s 180-degree U-turn on the issue and this without any amendment to the charter. (note 3, p. 279)

The authors do not address the historical context behind the inclusion of the non-political mandate in the Bank’s Articles nor its role in protecting the Bank itself against outside political influence, shielding it from external criticism and ensuring its integrity on the world’s capital markets.

244 Personal communication.

245 A senior World Bank staff member told me that the memo received in reply was a ‘very big slap on the wrist for even daring to become involved in this nonsense’.

246 Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999), ‘The Global Coalition Against Corruption’, p. 267.

247 Quoted in Celarier, M. (1996), ‘Corruption: the Search for the Smoking Gun’, *Euromoney*, p. 37.

248 Quoted in Brummer, A. (1999), ‘The People’s Plutocrat’, *The Guardian (London)*, 12 June, p. 6.

249 Brummer, A. (1999), ‘The People’s Plutocrat’, p. 6.

- 250 Shihata, I. (1997), 'Corruption and the Role of the World Bank', *Dickinson Journal of International Law*, 15 (3), p. 475.
- 251 Wolfensohn, J. (1997), 'Accountants and Society: Serving the Public Interest', remarks to the World Congress of Accountants, Paris, 26 October.
- 252 Wolfensohn, J. (1996), '1996 Annual Meetings Speech', address to the Board of Governors, World Bank/IMF, Washington DC, 1 October (emphasis in original).
- 253 Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999), 'The Global Coalition Against Corruption', p. 267.
- 254 The group was co-ordinated by Mike Stevens and included Ladipo Adamolekun, Peter Calderon, Michael Cohen, Alejandro Escobar, Gunnar Eskeland, Louis Forget, Anthony Gaeta, Cheryl Gray, Daniela Gressani, Rohil Hafeez, Ernesto Henriod, Petter Langseth, Kathryn Larrecq, Karin Millett, John Nellis, Klaus Rohland, Malcolm Rowat, Alfonso Sanchez, Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Paul Siegelbaum, Raghavan Srinivasan, Frederick Staphenurst, Stephen Weissman, Jim Wesberry and Myla Williams, with additional support from Peter Eigen and Jeremy Pope of TI. Many of these participants are still actively involved in anti-corruption work both within and outside the Bank. Daniel Kaufmann, an important force in the Bank's ongoing anti-corruption effort, was working at Harvard as a visiting scholar at this time. However, while there he published a paper entitled 'Listening to Stakeholders Spell the C..... Word: the "Tackling-Corruption-is-Taboo" Myth meets some Evidence'. An annotated bibliography of anti-corruption sources published by the World Bank describes this paper as advocating that the Bank emphasizes reducing corruption in its approach to lending. Prior to this, Kaufmann worked as Bank Chief of Mission in Ukraine, and other papers he published at Harvard focus on corruption in Ukraine. It is interesting that he was away from the Bank working on corruption at the time when the Bank's original anti-corruption strategy was being devised, and then returned from Harvard to head WBI's anti-corruption initiatives.
- 255 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption: the Role of the World Bank* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 3.
- 256 World Bank (1996), 'Bank Takes Anti-Corruption Stance', *World Bank News*, 11 October.
- 257 World Bank (1996), 'Bank Takes Anti-Corruption Stance'.
- 258 World Bank (1999), 'World Bank Chief Highlights Anti-Corruption Fight', *Development News*, 12 October.
- 259 Eizenstat, S. (1999), 'An Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Strategy for the Twenty-First Century', speech given at the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, Washington DC, 24 February.
- 260 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 2.
- 261 In a recent publication, this has changed from 'preventing' fraud to 'minimizing' fraud. World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 7. This may reflect the acceptance that some minimal level of corruption is to be expected, especially in an organization the size of the

Bank, and this new wording could help deflect criticism if corruption is found which involves Bank staff. I posed this to a senior staff member, who first replied that the change is insignificant, but then paused for a moment and agreed with my conclusion.

- 262 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 3.
- 263 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 6.
- 264 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, pp. 11–12.
- 265 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 44.
- 266 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 47, note 46.
- 267 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 51.
- 268 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 52.

#### 4 The World Bank's Anti-Corruption Programme

- 1 Huther, J. and Shah, A. (2000), 'Anti-corruption Policies and Programs: a Framework for Evaluation', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2501, December, p. 2.
- 2 Cited in Simon, D. (1995), 'Debt, Democracy and Development: Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s', in Simon D. et al. (eds), *Structurally Adjusted Africa: Poverty, Debt and Basic Needs* (London: Pluto Press), p. 24.
- 3 See Samoff and Stromquist's early study of the Bank's new role as 'Knowledge Bank'. Samoff, J. and Stromquist, N. (2001), 'Managing Knowledge and Storing Wisdom? New Forms of Foreign Aid?', *Development and Change*, 32 (September), p. 639, note 13.
- 4 Unless otherwise noted, this section draws on PREM's website. This is available at <http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/supporting.htm>.
- 5 Personal communication with senior DfID staff member.
- 6 A phrase attributed to Moody-Stuart, G. (1997), *Grand Corruption: How Business Bribes Damage Developing Countries*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Oxford: Worldview Publishing).
- 7 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 43.
- 8 See <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/supporting.htm>.
- 9 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 43.
- 10 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 44.
- 11 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 44.
- 12 I was told that this is 'not by coincidence' but a direct result of the G7 statement on corruption in 1996 that urged the regional banks to formulate policy based on the principles established by the World Bank. Personal communication with ADB staff member. See, for example, AfDB (1999), 'African Development Bank Group Policy on Good Governance', Internet accessed November 2000. Available at <http://www.afdb.org/about/ocod/governance.pdf>; AfDB (1999), 'African Development Bank Policy on Good Governance Adopted by Board of Directors', Internet, News Release COMU/B/32/99, Abidjan, 22 September; ADB (2000), 'Anticorruption Policy', Internet accessed November 2000. Available at [http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Anticorruption/corruption\\_policy.pdf](http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Anticorruption/corruption_policy.pdf). IADB has no concrete policy on corruption, but there is still



- work being done. See, for example, Inter-American Development Bank (2000), 'Conferencia sobre Transparenciay Desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe'. Internet. Accessed November 2000. Available at <http://www.iadb.org/leg/Transparencia.asp>. There is also IADB's website on the reform of the state, which does not actually mention corruption, available at <http://www.iadb.org/exr/topics/modstate.htm>.
- 13 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 45.
  - 14 EBRD chooses to focus primarily on ensuring its own procurement procedures are transparent and maximize its own projects' efficiency. See <http://www.ebrd.org/english/procure/main.htm>.
  - 15 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 46.
  - 16 OECD (1997), 'Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', Internet accessed December 1998. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bribery/20nov1e.htm>.
  - 17 Members include the US, Germany, Japan, France, UK, Italy, Canada, Korea, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Mexico, Australia, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Ireland, Finland, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, Hungary, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Greece and Iceland, while the non-member signatories include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the Slovak Republic.
  - 18 OECD (2000), 'Welcome to the OECD Anti-Corruption Unit', Internet accessed October 2000. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/index.htm>.
  - 19 TI also independently monitors implementation of the Convention, and has produced country reports on several countries. These can be found at <http://www.transparency.de/activities/oecd.html>.
  - 20 FATF (2000), 'Welcome to the new FATF website', Internet accessed October 2000. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/fatf/index.htm>.
  - 21 These include the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the Council of Europe PC-R-EV Committee, Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), Intergovernmental Task Force against Money Laundering in Africa (ITFMLA), AsDB, the Commonwealth Secretariat, EBRD, IADB, IMF, Interpol, International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Organization of American States/Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD), Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS), UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), World Customs Organization (WCO) and the World Bank.
  - 22 Interview with UNDP staff member.
  - 23 UNDP (1999), 'UNDP Announces Launch of Partnership Fund for Transparency at Ninth International Anti-Corruption Conference', press release, 13 October.
  - 24 UNDP (2001), *PACT Bi-Annual Report to BMZ (August 2000–January 2001)* (New York: UNDP–PACT), p. 18.
  - 25 See <http://www.gca-cma.org/eabout.htm>.

- 26 See Global Coalition for Africa (1997), 'Corruption and Development in Africa', paper read at the 1997 Policy Forum, Maputo, Mozambique, 1–2 November.
- 27 There is potential within this relationship for conflict of interest, with the Bank as the largest provider of funding and as the former employer of so many of its key staff. This relationship deserves external evaluation.
- 28 Galtung, F. and Pope, J. (1999) 'The Global Coalition Against Corruption: Evaluating Transparency International' in Schedler, A., Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds), *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), pp. 266–7.
- 29 See <http://www.delna.lv/english/index.htm>.
- 30 Transparency International (1999), 'TI Country Activities', *TI Newsletter*, June, p. 14.
- 31 World Bank (2001), 'The World Bank Operational Manual', Internet accessed February 2001. Available at <http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/opmanual.nsf/textdefinition1?opennavigator>.
- 32 See <http://www.worldbank.org/whatwedo/policies.htm>.
- 33 See <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040574~menuPK:34574~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600~theSitePK:29708,00.html>.
- 34 Staff working on corruption do not seem, in the main, to distinguish between policy and strategy. Either they fail to recognize the difference, or feel it is unimportant to differentiate the two. When interviewed, one staff member indicated that the 1997 document, *Helping Countries Curb Corruption*, is a policy statement, because it was cleared by the Board. However, all documents published by the Bank have a lengthy clearing process with ultimate approval by the Board, and this has never been the sole determinant for making official policy statements. An original architect of the programme pointed out a specific passage in the 1997 document and described it as the policy statement: 'Where corruption is widespread and affects a country's development objectives and Bank-financed projects, the Bank needs to raise the issue with borrowers and seek ways to help governments and civil society address it.' See World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 7. This statement was also highlighted as Bank 'policy' by Anita Baker, Manager of the Office of Professional Ethics (OPE) at the International Institute for Public Ethics Year 2000 Conference. See Baker, A. (2000), 'Ethics: the View from Multilateral Institutions – WBG: a Framework of Integrity', presentation at the International Institute for Public Ethics Year 2000 Conference, 27 September. However, a senior staff member contradicted these co-workers, saying that there is no policy statement in the form of one document, describing the 1997 document as a report and nothing more than that.
- 35 For example, in countries where women's rights are restricted by law, as in some Middle Eastern countries, requiring that their interests are taken into account in project design and implementation can be very controversial indeed.
- 36 See <http://www.worldbank.org/ks/vision.html>.

- 37 World Bank (2000), *Reforming Public Institutions & Strengthening Governance: a World Bank Strategy* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 2.
- 38 Huther, J. and Shah, A. (2000), 'Anti-corruption Policies and Programs', p. 2.
- 39 I presented this methodological weakness to Dr Shah in an email, but he did not comment on it.
- 40 Eigen, P. (2000), 'Introductory statement by Peter Eigen for the press conference on the role of the World Bank in the fight against corruption', TI Press Release, 31 August. It could be argued that Eigen sees an opportunity here for an expanded role for TI.
- 41 Jakobeit, C. (1999), 'The World Bank and Human Development: Washington's New Strategic Approach', *Development and Cooperation*, November/December, p. 5.
- 42 Samoff, J. and Stromquist, N. (2001), 'Managing Knowledge and Storing Wisdom?', p. 641.
- 43 Samoff, J. and Stromquist, N. (2001), 'Managing Knowledge and Storing Wisdom?', p. 650.
- 44 Goldman, M. (2003), 'The Power of World Bank knowledge', Internet accessed 17 January. Available at <http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/knowledgebank/goldmanarticle.html>.
- 45 Mehta, L. (2001), 'The World Bank and its Emerging Knowledge Empire', *Human Organization*, 60 (2).
- 46 Khan, M. (2002), 'Corruption and Governance in Early Capitalism: World Bank Strategies and their Limitations', in Pincus, J. and Winters, J. (eds), *Reinventing the World Bank* (London: Cornell University Press), p. 165.
- 47 Khan, M. (2002), 'Corruption and Governance in Early Capitalism', p. 165.
- 48 Interview with senior World Bank staff member. The Bank's website also refers to its 'evolving strategy'. See <http://www1.worldbank.org/public-sector/anticorrupt/helping.htm>.
- 49 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 4.
- 50 See <http://www.worldbank.org/cdf>.
- 51 Wolfensohn, J. D. (1999), 'A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework: A Discussion Draft', 21 January. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/cdf/cdf.pdf>.
- 52 Wolfensohn, J. D. (1999). 'A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework', p. 32.
- 53 'The expression [National Integrity System] is of recent origin, having emerged from discussions within the Transparency International movement and widely popularized by development agencies.' Transparency International (2000), *TI Source Book 2000*, (Berlin: Transparency International), p. 32. TI has produced a Source Book to assist countries in building a National Integrity System, with an emphasis on 'integrity pillars', including the executive, parliament, the judiciary, civil service, 'watchdog' agencies, civil society, mass media and international agencies.
- 54 Wolfensohn, J. D. (1999), 'A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework', p. 35.

- 55 McDonald, I. (2000), 'From the Editor', *Finance & Development*. 37 (2).
- 56 An evaluation conducted by the Swedish development agency, SIDA, backs this up. It found that projects on capacity building too often assumed incorrectly that 'the beneficiary is willing and able to develop his/her capacity'. SIDA (2000), *The Evaluability of Democracy and Human Rights Projects: a Logframe-related assessment* (SIDA Studies in Evaluation – ITAD Ltd./ODI. Gothenburg: SIDA), p. 53 (emphasis in original).
- 57 According to Art. 3.5(b), 'The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted.' World Bank (1944), 'Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (amended 1989)' (Washington DC: World Bank). Art. 5.1(g) of the IDA's Articles contains similar wording.
- 58 Aguilar, M., Gill, J. and Pino, L. (2000), *Preventing Fraud and Corruption in World Bank Projects: a Guide for Staff* (Washington DC: World Bank), pp. 2–3; World Bank (1997). *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 29.
- 59 According to the 1997 *World Bank Annual Report*, 'The Strategic Compact is a plan for fundamental reform to make the Bank more effective in delivering its regional program and in achieving its basic mission of reducing poverty.' World Bank (1997), *World Bank Annual Report* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 1. It is the Bank's official business strategy. For more information, see <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrd/comsum.htm>.
- 60 Since June 1997 fifty-three new procurement staff have been hired (sixteen in Washington and thirty-seven in country offices). The majority of new staff have gone to the ECA and AFR regions. World Bank (2000), *The World Bank Procurement Function Annual Report FY99*, p. 3.
- 61 'The CPAR is intended to be a useful tool to diagnose the health of the existing procurement system in a country and, in the process, generate a dialogue with the government focused on needed reforms. The main purpose of the CPAR is to establish the need for and guide the development of an action plan to improve a country's system for procuring goods, works and services.' World Bank (2000), 'Country Procurement Assessment Reports (CPARs)', Internet accessed November 2000. Available at <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/cpar.htm>. The CPAR has been used since the early 1980s but was redesigned in 1998. The old CPAR looked into the accountability of national bidding procedures, used when a contract was unlikely to attract foreign competition, to see if they were acceptable. The Bank decided this was not a particularly useful tool. Instead, the CPAR is now used as a diagnostic tool for the Bank and donors in general. They 'broadened the scope' from individual Bank projects to an assessment of overall procurement capacity as an element of governance. The CPAR is conducted jointly with the borrower and the Bank, with other donors sometimes involved as well. This self-assessment component is intended to ensure government ownership. Interview with senior World Bank staff member.
- 62 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, pp. 7–9.
- 63 Aguilar, M. et al. (2000), *Preventing Fraud and Corruption in World Bank Projects*, pp. 3–9.

- 64 World Bank (1999), 'Master Bidding Documents: Procurement of Goods and Users' Guide'. Internet accessed October 2000. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr/procure/mdbgoods.html>; World Bank (1997), 'Standard Request for Proposals: Selection of Consultants', Internet accessed October 2000. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr/consult/rfp/r-titlpg.html>.
- 65 Aguilar, M. et al. (2000), *Preventing Fraud and Corruption in World Bank Projects*, p. 14.
- 66 'The CFAA is a diagnosis of a country's private and public financial management systems. Its purpose is twofold: (i) to help the borrower and the Bank assess and manage the risk that public funds will be used other than for agreed purposes (the fiduciary objective), and (ii) to support the borrower in the design and implementation of financial management capacity-building programs (the developmental objective).' World Bank (2000), 'Country Financial Accountability Assessment', Internet accessed November 2000. Available at <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/cfaa.htm>.
- 67 Aguilar, M. et al. (2000), *Preventing Fraud and Corruption in World Bank Projects*, pp. 15–16.
- 68 World Bank (1998), 'World Bank Sets Up Hotline', News Release, 30 October.
- 69 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 17.
- 70 Wolfensohn, J. D. (1998), 'New Measures to Combat Fraud and Corruption', World Bank Staff Memo, p. 3.
- 71 Wolfensohn, J. D. (1998), 'New Measures to Combat Fraud and Corruption', p. 3.
- 72 World Bank (1999), *Guidelines*, p. 8.
- 73 See <http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/prevent.htm> for more information.
- 74 Wolfensohn, J. D. (1998), 'New Measures to Combat Fraud and Corruption', p. 1.
- 75 Sierra, K. (1998), 'Ethical Guide for Bank Staff Handling Procurement Matters in Bank-Financed Projects'. World Bank Operational Core Services Memo.
- 76 See [http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/acfiu/acfiuweb.nsf/\(WebDisplay\)/AbouttheInvestigationsUnit?open](http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/acfiu/acfiuweb.nsf/(WebDisplay)/AbouttheInvestigationsUnit?open) document. I asked the Ethics Department why this rule was amended as late as 1997 and what happened to staff involved in fraud prior to this. The response contradicted the information available on the website. Staff have always been fired for involvement in fraudulent activities involving Bank funds and this amendment reflected 'what was in fact already happening in the case of staff fraud' (personal communication). When I requested further clarification, I was referred to a senior staff member, who concurred that staff have always been terminated for fraud, and that the amendment to Staff Rule 8.01 merely provided protection for whistleblowers. Recently, seven people were fired, with five for fraud and two for falsification of documents (two are currently appealing their termination). The Bank, like other multilateral institutions, is unique in that it has immunity and cannot be sued by its employees, current or former. Therefore, a great

- deal of attention must be taken to ensure that the due rights of staff are taken into consideration in these matters. Ironically, s/he says that more people were fired before 1990 for fraud than now because of the complex appeals process put into place to ensure the protection of staff rights.
- 77 World Bank (1999), *Living Our Values* (Washington DC: World Bank).
- 78 See <http://www.worldbank.org/ethics>.
- 79 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, pp. 18–19. This amendment about whistleblowers is definitely ‘a response to and part of anti-corruption initiatives’ at the Bank. The senior staff member I interviewed said that it is very difficult to write policy for whistleblowers, but it is vital for improving the workplace atmosphere and for providing an ethical workplace. Staff must have a safe way to raise issues and concerns without fear of repercussions.
- 80 USGAO (2000), ‘World Bank: Management Controls Stronger, but Challenges in Fighting Corruption Remain’, report to Congressional Committees, GAO/NSIAD-00-73, April, pp. 15–16.
- 81 USGAO (2000), ‘World Bank’, pp. 5–7. In 1998, US Senator Mitch McConnell, a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee which approves funding levels for the Bank, expressed great concern about alleged corruption at the Bank and called for the GAO report. He accused the Bank of being ‘secretive and rife with “cronyism and deceit”’ and called for the immediate resignation of US Executive Director Jan Piercy ‘for failing “to serve US interests”’. Ms Piercy was defended by her boss, US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, who nonetheless expressed concern over the corruption allegations. It is thus in the Bank’s best interest to ensure a transparent and well-publicized investigation process to ward off this type of attack. ‘World Bank President Defends Handling of Corruption Cases’, *Bloomberg*, 17 July 1999; ‘Rubin Calls Allegations of World Bank Corruption “Serious”’, *Bloomberg*, 17 July 1999.
- 82 USGAO (2000), ‘World Bank’, p. 34.
- 83 The CAS is handled in detail later in the chapter.
- 84 Letter from Wolfensohn to Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, dated 16/3/00, in USGAO (2000). ‘World Bank’, pp. 52–5.
- 85 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, pp. 19–20.
- 86 Thornburgh, R., Gainer, P. and Walker, C. (2000), ‘World Bank: Concerning Mechanisms to Address Problems of Fraud and Corruption’, report to Shengman Zhang, Managing Director and Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Fraud and Corruption, 21 January (rev.), (internal document), pp. 2–3, 41–2.
- 87 Fidler, S. (2001), ‘Corruption Leads to Freeze on Trust Funds: World Bank Five European Governments Act after Organisation’s Staff were Found to have Received Kickbacks’, *Financial Times*, 7 Feb.; World Bank (2000), ‘World Bank Investigation Reveal Three Staff Members and Swedish Firms Engaged in Corruption; Staff Members Fired, Funds to be Reimbursed’, News Release No. 2001/144/S, 6 December; World Bank (2000), ‘World Bank Fires Three Staffers for Alleged Corruption’, *Development News*, 7 December.

- 88 'NIDB Denies Fraud Allegation, States Position', *The Guardian (Nigeria)*, 13 December 2000; 'Nigeria to Probe Corruption in Industrial Bank', *South African Broadcasting Corporation*, 29 January 2000; World Bank (2000), 'Briefly Noted', *Development News*, 31 January.
- 89 World Bank (2000), 'World Bank Warns of Investment Schemes Misrepresenting its Name', News Release No. 2000/345/S, 17 May.
- 90 World Bank (2001), 'Crackdown on Corruption in East Timor', Press Release, 25 January.
- 91 TI (2000), 'Ghana: World Bank Turns Off the Taps on Water Project', *TI Newsletter*, October, p. 11.
- 92 'World Bank Launches Investigations Against its Former Manager', *The Nation (Kenya)*, 12 December 2001.
- 93 It is too early to report any institutional or procedural changes that will come out of this. At this point in time, this is more a consolidation of existing practice rather than an example of new practice, and much remains the same but under a different body.
- 94 Mr de Jong was previously Managing Director of the European Institute for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EULEC). United Nations (2001), 'World Bank Names Law Enforcement Expert to Fight Fraud and Corruption', Internet accessed 23 April. Available at <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200101160187.html>; World Bank (2001), 'Fighting Fraud: World Bank Appoints Maarten de Jong as Director of Institutional Integrity', *Development News*, 12 April.
- 95 See <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/prevent.htm>.
- 96 Interview with World Bank staff member.
- 97 Thornburgh, R. et al. (2000), 'World Bank', p. 25.
- 98 Cooksey, B. (1999), 'Do Aid Agencies Have a Comparative Advantage in Fighting Corruption in Africa?', p. 2.
- 99 Cooksey, B. (1999), 'Do Aid Agencies Have a Comparative Advantage in Fighting Corruption in Africa?', p. 3.
- 100 In particular, see Harriss-White, B. and White, G. (1996), 'Corruption, Liberalisation and Democracy', *IDS Bulletin*, 27 (2), pp. 1–5; Hawley, S. (2000), 'Exporting Corruption: Privatisation, Multinationals and Bribery', Corner House Briefing No. 19, June; Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R. (eds) (1992), *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Watt, D., Flanary, R. and Theobald, R. (2000), 'Democratisation or the Democratisation of Corruption? The Case of Uganda', in Doig, A. and Theobald, R. (eds), *Corruption and Democratisation* (London: Frank Cass & Co.), pp. 37–64; Bayart, J-F., Ellis, S. and Hibou, B. (1999), *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (Oxford: James Currey); Riley, S. (1998), 'The Political Economy of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Africa', in Robinson, M. (ed.), *Corruption and Development* (London: Frank Cass), pp. 129–59.
- 101 Defined by the report as 'the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials'. World Bank (2000), *Anticorruption in Transition: a Contribution to the Policy Debate* (Washington DC: World Bank), pp. xv, 32 (emphasis in original).

- 102 World Bank (2000), *Anticorruption in Transition*, p. 32.
- 103 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 4.
- 104 World Bank (2000), *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance*, p. 13.
- 105 Interview with World Bank staff member.
- 106 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 22.
- 107 Parts of this section draws on WBI's website. This is available at <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/>.
- 108 WBI's approach has been summed up as a formula: GI & AC = F (KI, LE, CA), or 'Successful Governance Improvement (GI) and Anti-Corruption programs (AC) are dependent on the public availability of Knowledge and Information (KI) plus political Leadership (LE) plus Collective Action (CA).' The F apparently stands for 'Formula'.
- 109 See <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/overview.htm#strategy>.
- 110 World Bank (2000), 'Key Instruments for Institutional and Governance Analysis', Internet accessed November 2000. Available at <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/keyinstruments.htm>.
- 111 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 24.
- 112 WBI (1999), *New Empirical Tools for Anti-Corruption and Institutional Reform: A Step-by-Step Guide to Their Implementation* (Washington DC: World Bank).
- 113 WBI (1999), *New Empirical Tools for Anti-Corruption and Institutional Reform*.
- 114 Huther, J. and Shah, A. (2000), 'Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs', p. 6.
- 115 WBI (1999), *Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African Countries*, prepared as background for the 9<sup>th</sup> Annual International Conference Against Corruption (IACC), Durban, South Africa, 10–15 October.
- 116 WBI (1999), *Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African Countries*, p. 14.
- 117 WBI (1999), *Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African Countries*, preface.
- 118 WBI (1999), *Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African Countries*, p. 7.
- 119 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 36.
- 120 WBI (1999), *New Empirical Tools for Anti-Corruption and Institutional Reform*.
- 121 Transparency International (2000), 'Country Activities', *TI Newsletter*, September.
- 122 WBI (2000), 'Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition'. Internet, accessed November 2000, p. 2. Available at [http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/guide\\_pdfs/08b-ghana\\_example.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/guide_pdfs/08b-ghana_example.pdf).
- 123 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 2.
- 124 See <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/resultsmainstreaming.htm>.
- 125 World Bank (2000), 'What is a Country Assistance Strategy?', Internet, accessed November 2000. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/pic/cas/whatis.htm>.
- 126 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 57.



- 127 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 63.
- 128 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 38.
- 129 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 38.
- 130 World Bank (2000), 'World Bank Policy on Information Disclosure (Discussion Draft)', Internet accessed September 2000. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/pic/disclosure/draftpolicy-en.pdf>.
- 131 World Bank (2000), 'Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation to the Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Republic of Ghana', CAS No. 2018S-GH, 29 June, p. 3. It is of course also possible that the central government fears losing control of resources.
- 132 World Bank (2000), 'Memorandum', pp. 3, 5.
- 133 World Bank (2000), 'Memorandum', pp. 14–15.
- 134 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 12, Annex C, p. 2.
- 135 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 15.
- 136 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 41.
- 137 World Bank (2000), 'Key Points from the EAP Anti-corruption Advisory Group Meeting: Third Meeting with EAP Management Team', Internet accessed November 2000. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/eapsocial/library/anticorrupt.pdf>.
- 138 World Bank (2000), 'India: Policies to Reduce Poverty and Accelerate Sustainable Development', Internet accessed November 2000. Available at [http://WBLN1018.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/Attachments/GoodGovernance/\\$File/chapt4.pdf](http://WBLN1018.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/Attachments/GoodGovernance/$File/chapt4.pdf).
- 139 World Bank (2000), 'Poverty Reduction and Economic Management in Europe and Central Asia', Internet accessed November 2000. Available at <http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/66d6f5004ed085ca852567d10011a8b8/2adef1166610169b852567f500043237?OpenDocument>.
- 140 World Bank (2000), 'Public Sector Development'. Internet accessed November 2000. Available at <http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/All/15E5A7D635C9AB368525695200586920?OpenDocument>.
- 141 For further information on the LAC Region's work on good governance and corruption, see <http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/external/lac/lac.nsf/45b1a64b68f7a2d3852567d6006c364a/9947299068d941c4852567ee00568da9?OpenDocument>.
- 142 Burki, S. and Perry, G. (1998), *Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter* (Washington DC: World Bank).
- 143 See <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/overview.htm>.
- 144 See World Bank (2000), 'Community Driven Development: a Vision of Poverty Reduction through Empowerment', mimeo, draft version only.
- 145 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 3.
- 146 Even one of the Bank's biggest partners in anti-corruption expressed concern regarding the potential for increased political conditionality and intervention in a sovereign country's political affairs. In 1996, TI said, 'We would not like to see the Bank dictating to governments and understand that it has no intention of doing so. Still less would we want to see elements of conditionality creeping in.' Transparency International

- (1996), 'TI supports World Bank initiative', *TI Newsletter*. December. However, subsequent publications have called on the Bank do just this: to reduce lending levels for countries that 'do not have convincing anti-corruption reform programmes in place and which do not collaborate with external efforts to promote such programmes'. Transparency International (2000), 'World Bank Needs to Strengthen its Anti-corruption Work, says Transparency International', press release, 31 August.
- 147 See <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/overview.htm#whoarewe>.
- 148 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, pp. 28–9.
- 149 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 27.
- 150 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 29.
- 151 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 44. The Bank's findings continue to support this. See World Bank (2000), *Anticorruption in Transition*, p. 79; Huther, J. and Shah, A. (2000), 'Anti-Corruption Policies & Programs', pp. 7, 9; Pope, J. and Vogl, F. (2000), 'Making Anticorruption Agencies More Effective', *Finance & Development*, 37 (2), pp. 6–9. These sources and others generally agree that anti-corruption agencies can be effective but require certain conditions: an independent judiciary, for example. These conditions do not exist in many of the countries the Bank lends to and would therefore not provide an effective entry point for an anti-corruption strategy. Interestingly, the Bank does not refer to the rather extensive and important work within political science on the effectiveness of such bodies. See, for example, the contributions by Moran, Theobald and Williams and Williams in Doig, A. and Theobald, R. (2000), *Corruption and Democratisation*. (London: Frank Cass).
- 152 World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, pp. 28–36, 72–99.
- 153 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, p. 5.
- 154 Brinkerhoff, D. with Kulibaba, N. (1999), 'Identifying and Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts', USAID Working Paper No. 13, January, p. 3.
- 155 World Bank (1999), 'Assessing Political Commitment to Fighting Corruption', PREM Notes No. 29, September, p. 1.
- 156 Frank Vogl, formerly World Bank Director of Information and Public Affairs and now TI-USA, criticizes WBI's work on media training, saying that the organization lacks credibility, is inconsistent with its own research and is too open to unwanted influence. Bretton Woods Project (2001), 'World Bank Warned: Don't Meddle with Media', *Bretton Woods Update*, 23 (June/July), p. 8. This work is indeed proving controversial. Mark Tomlinson, World Bank Country Director of Nigeria, has recently called out for the government to remove its Official Secrets Act from its constitution to assist the media in the country to investigate corruption. Garba, K. A. (2001), 'How Media can Boost Anti-corruption Campaign, by World Bank chief', *The Guardian (Nigeria)*, 15 February. This can be seen as an example of Bank staff becoming too involved in a country's political affairs and ignoring the balance between the government's needs and the public's needs (or the donor institution's needs).

- 157 Two examples are loans to Guinea (Capacity Building for Service Delivery and Rural Decentralization) and Cameroon (Decentralization). Interview with senior World Bank staff member.
- 158 Kaufmann, D. (1999), 'New Frontiers in World Bank Programmes', *Democracy Dialogue*, June (Washington DC: USAID-CDG), pp. 4-5. There is another apparent divergence in approach between PREM and WBI, and the two may be linked. The PREM strategy document acknowledges criticism about the 'technocratic' nature of its work and discusses moves away from this approach; however, in the same document, WBI describes its own approach as technocratic. See World Bank (2000), *Reforming Public Institutions & Strengthening Governance*, pp. 17, 151. A senior staff member that I interviewed believes that the work done by WBI is very different from the usual sectoral work being done, in that it is much more sensitive and could be accused of being very political (for example, media training, parliaments). Hence, WBI insists on focusing on the empirical and technical side of its work to avoid criticism in this area and must have high-level political support to avoid accusations of political interference.
- 159 United States Information Agency (1997), 'Global Coalition on Africa to Help Fight Corruption', *Africa News Online*, 17 November, p. 2, available at [http://www.africanews.org/usafrica/stories/19971117\\_feat3.html](http://www.africanews.org/usafrica/stories/19971117_feat3.html).
- 160 'Mkapa Can't Fight Corruption Singlehandedly', *Observer (Tanzania)*, 5 October 1997; 'Mkapa, MacNamara [sic] Agree about Corruption', *The Guardian (Tanzania)*, 3 October 1997, pp. 1, 2; 'Ex-WB Chief Urges Transparency', *Daily News*, 4 October 1997; Djiwan, H. (1997), 'Kerekou est prêt à lutter contre la corruption', *Le Citoyen*, 3 September, p. 3; Djiwan, H. (1997), 'La guerre contre la corruption', *Le Citoyen*, 2 September, p. 3; De Sousa, S. (1997), 'Conférence-lébat de la Coalition mondiale pour l'Afrique (CMA) et Transparency International (TI): Pour consolider la moralisation de la vie publique', *Echos Nation*, 2 September.
- 161 Personal communication with GCA staff member.
- 162 Mwambando, L. (1997), 'Reform Tendering in IRP II - MacNamara [sic]', *Observer (Tanzania)*, October. See also, Mwakisya, J. (1997), 'Donors May Freeze Aid to Tanzania Over Corruption' *The East African*, 6-12 October, pp. 1, 2; 'World Bank to Set New Conditions on Aid to Tanzania - MacNamara [sic]', *Observer (Tanzania)*, October 1997, pp. 1, 3.
- 163 In a study of the World Bank undertaken immediately after McNamara's retirement, Ayres concluded: 'Instead of countries coming to the Bank with identifiable projects perceived as possible solutions to existing problems, the Bank went to countries with solutions and requested the identification of problems for potential funding.' I would suggest that McNamara's GCA trip can be construed as a continuation of this policy. Ayres, R. (1983), *Banking on the Poor: the World Bank and World Poverty* (London: MIT Press), p. 215.
- 164 World Bank (2001), 'What is Civil Society?', Internet, 10 January, accessed 10 August 2001. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/wbp/scapital/sources/civil1.htm#top>.
- 165 Nagle, J. and Mahr, A. (1999), *Democracy and Democratization*, p. 64. For example, Jeffries points out that all World Bank discussions on civil

- society exclude any mention of trade unions. Jeffries, R. (1993), 'The State, Structural Adjustment and Good Government in Africa', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 31 (1), p. 32.
- 166 Kasfir, N. (1998), 'Introduction: the Conventional Notion of Civil Society: a Critique', in Kasfir, N. (ed.), *Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives* (London: Frank Cass), p. 1.
- 167 Abrahamsen, R. (2000), *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* (London: Zed Books), p. 52.
- 168 Abrahamsen, R. (2000), *Disciplining Democracy*, p. 56. This finding is also reported in Hearn, J. and Robinson, M. (2000), 'Civil Society and Democracy Assistance in Africa', in Burnell, P. (ed.), *Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization* (London: Frank Cass), pp. 241–62.
- 169 Francis, P. (2001), 'Participatory Development at the World Bank: the Primacy of Process', in Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (eds), *Participation: the New Tyranny?* (London: Zed Books), pp. 81, 87.
- 170 Abrahamsen, R. (2000), *Disciplining Democracy*, pp. 56–9.
- 171 Abrahamsen, R. (2000), *Disciplining Democracy*, p. 59. This includes a partial quote from World Bank (1989), *Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 58.
- 172 Ottaway, M. and Carothers, T. (2000), 'Toward Civil Society Realism', in Ottaway, M. and Carothers, T. (eds), *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), p. 299.
- 173 One example is the 31st December Women's Movement (31stDWM), headed by the wife of former Ghanaian president Jerry Rawlings. It was originally part of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), Rawling's political party, and was used to generate political support for Rawling's campaign from women. However, in the 1980s, the 31stDWM withdrew from the PNDC to become an NGO, in order to receive aid money. Its nature may have changed but its purpose remains the same.
- 174 In a recent Bank-sponsored email discussion group on anti-corruption strategies, no fewer than six individuals offered their services to the Bank as consultants. This is, of course, not evidence of corruption or even corrupt intent. It does, however, remind us that where demand has been created, there will always be 'experts' to fill that demand.
- 175 Cooksey, B. (1999), 'Do Aid Agencies Have a Comparative Advantage in Fighting Corruption in Africa?', paper given at the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), Durban, South Africa, 10–15 October, p. 16.
- 176 Nelson, P. (1995), *The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations: the Limits of Non-political Development* (London: Macmillan), pp. 112–41.
- 177 Some NGOs include IRIS, Global Coalition for Africa, Centro Latinoamericano de Administracion para le DeSarrolo, Carter Center, Asia Foundation, Civil Service College (UK), Open Society Institute, Escola de Administracao Fazendaria (Brazil), Ford Foundation, Lawyers

- Committee for Human Rights, Danish Center for Human Rights, Institute for Democracy in South Africa, National Democratic Institute, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Sweden), Centre Quest-Africain des Media et du Development, Association of Journalists (Tanzania), Uganda Management Institute, Radio Nederland and the Groupe de Recherche et d'Echanges Technologiques. For these and others, see World Bank (2000), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, pp. 31–2.
- 178 World Rainforest Movement (2000), 'Chad–Cameroon: the World Bank Again Shows Who it Serves', WRM Bulletin No. 35, June.
- 179 Brown, P. (2002), 'Chad Oil Pipeline Under Attack for Harming the Poor', *The Guardian (UK)*, 27 September.
- 180 See Klein Haarhuis, C. and Leeuw, F. (2000). 'Fighting Corruption: Evaluating Impact and the World Bank Institute's Program Theory', mimeo, University of Utrecht, p. 7; Klein Haarhuis, C. and Leeuw, F. (2000), 'Measuring and Explaining Variance between Anti-Corruption Policies', paper presented at the EES Conference – Working Group Realist Evaluations, Lausanne, 12–14 October 2000, p. 6.
- 181 Finch, C. D. (1996), 'G7 Corruption Project', *The International Economy*, 10 (6), p. 26.
- 182 Elliott, L. (2001), 'Leak Reveals Crisis at the World Bank', *The Guardian (London)*, 31 January; World Bank (2001), 'Soul-searching Uncovers Hidden Malaise at World Bank', *Development News*, 31 January; Hoyos, C. (2001), 'James Wolfensohn's Self-created Storm', *Financial Times*, 30 January.
- 183 Cited in Wilks, A. (2001), 'Overstretched and Underloved: World Bank Faces Strategy Decisions', Bretton Woods Project Briefing Paper, February, p. 3.
- 184 'Internal Conflict leaves World Bank Policy in Disarray', *The Observer (London)*, 4 February 2001, Business Section, p. 3.
- 185 Caufield refers here to Sir William Ryrrie, the former head of the IFC. According to Caufield, 'Ryrrie ... argued that the Bank was institutionally incapable of ... "using its influence to bring about a reduction in state activity".' Caufield, C. (1997), *Masters of Illusion: the World Bank and the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Henry Holt and Company), p. 279.
- 186 Caufield, C. (1997), *Masters of Illusion*, p. 306. Cited also in Wilks, A. (2001), 'Overstretched and Underloved', p. 1.
- 187 Huther, J. and Shah, A. (2000), 'Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs', p. 2.
- 188 Transparency International (2000), 'World Bank Needs to Strengthen its Anti-corruption Work', TI Press Release, 31 August 2000.

## 5 The Significance of Comparative Advantage in Donor Work on Corruption

- 1 Linn, J. (2001), 'The World Bank's New Approach to Good Governance: Promises and Risks', *Transition Newsletter*, 12 (2), p. 3.
- 2 Mosley, P. (1987), *Overseas Aid: its Defence and Reform* (London: Wheatsheaf Books), pp. 103–5.

- 3 Dewald, M. and Weder, R. (1996), 'Comparative Advantage and Bilateral Foreign Aid Policy', *World Development*, 24 (3), p. 549.
- 4 Dewald and Weder highlight the Swiss banking system in the context of its overall aid programme and without anti-corruption work in mind. Clearly, this would not be where the Swiss have a comparative advantage in anti-corruption work because of the lack of transparency in its banking system.
- 5 See World Bank (1989), *World Development Report 1989: Financial Systems and Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- 6 Dewald, M. and Weder, R. (1996), 'Comparative Advantage and Bilateral Foreign Aid Policy', pp. 553–5.
- 7 Cooksey, B. (1999), 'Do Aid Agencies Have a Comparative Advantage in Fighting Corruption in Africa?', paper given at the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), Durban, South Africa, 10–15 October, p. 8. Former Bank president Lewis Preston admitted to this in the late 1980s. Cited in Williams, D. and Young, T. (1994), 'Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory', *Political Studies*, 42 (1), p. 88.
- 8 Cassen, R. (1994), *Does Aid Work?*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 177.
- 9 Cooksey, B. (1999), 'Do Aid Agencies Have a Comparative Advantage in Fighting Corruption in Africa?', p. 8. This builds on the economic notion of capital absorptive capacity, which is 'a more or less absolute limit to the amount of capital, foreign or domestic, that can be productively employed in the sense of yielding some net return over and above depreciation and obsolescence'. Mikesell, R. (1968), *The Economics of Foreign Aid* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson), p. 100. In other words, a donor can throw only so much money at a problem before the recipient will become unable to use the funding productively because of a lack of capacity. According to Mikesell, this can result from, among other things, a lack of good government (p. 101).
- 10 Dewald, M. and Weder, R. (1996), 'Comparative Advantage and Bilateral Foreign Aid Policy', p. 551.
- 11 Mosley, P. (1987), *Overseas Aid*, pp. 100–1.
- 12 Mosley, P. (1987), *Overseas Aid*, pp. 100–5.
- 13 Cassen, R. (1994), *Does Aid Work?*, p. 175.
- 14 Cassen, R. (1994), *Does Aid Work?*, p. 177.
- 15 Linn, J. (2001), 'The World Bank's New Approach to Good Governance: Promises and Risks', *Transition Newsletter*, 12 (2), p. 3.
- 16 NORAD (2001), *Annual Report 2001* (Oslo: NORAD), p. 23.
- 17 World Bank (1994), *Governance*, p. 41.
- 18 Gibbon, P. (1993), 'The World Bank and the New Politics of Aid', in Sørensen, G. (ed.), *Political Conditionality* (London: Frank Cass), p. 55.
- 19 Phillip, B. (1997), 'The World Bank and Governance: a Process Approach to Policy Analysis', unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, p. 100; also, Riley, S. (1992), 'Corruption and the Swollen African State: Economic Liberalisation & the New Political Conditionality', paper given at the 5th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), Amsterdam. Early claims of a donor victory when Kenya announced multiparty elections have been replaced now with cynicism. According

- to the *Economist*, 'Over the past few years Kenya has performed a curious mating ritual with its aid donors. The steps are: one, Kenya wins its yearly pledges of foreign aid. Two, the government begins to misbehave, backtracking on economic reform and behaving in an authoritarian manner. Three, a new meeting of donor countries looms with exasperated foreign governments preparing their sharp rebukes. Four, Kenya pulls a placatory rabbit out of the hat. Five, the donors are mollified and the aid is pledged. The whole dance then starts again' 'Aid for Kenya: Stop, Go', *The Economist*, 336 (7928), 19 August 1995, p. 51.
- 20 See Goshko, J. (1995), 'US Censures Nigeria's Execution of Nine Activists', *The Washington Post*, 11 September.
  - 21 Ayres, R. (1983), *Banking on the Poor*, pp. 71–2. The Bank did argue as early as 1954 that it 'cannot ignore conditions of political instability or uncertainty which may directly affect the economic and financial prospects of the borrower'. World Bank (1954), *The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1946–1953* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 61.
  - 22 Phillip, B. (1997), 'The World Bank and Governance', p. 275. For a look at Benin's subsequent national conferences and the impact on corruption, written by a former Bank staff member, see Heilbrunn, J. (1999), 'Corruption, Democracy, and Reform in Benin', in Schedler, A., Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds), *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), pp. 227–43.
  - 23 Gibbon, P. (1993), 'The World Bank and the New Politics of Aid', p. 39.
  - 24 Uvin, P. (1993). "'Do as I Say, Not as I Do": The Limits of Political Conditionality', in Sørensen, G. (ed.), *Political Conditionality* (London: Frank Cass), p. 67.
  - 25 World Bank (1997), *Helping Countries Combat Corruption: the Role of the World Bank* (Washington DC: World Bank), p. 8.
  - 26 The Dutch define corruption as 'using public goods or a public position for personal interests ... covering bribery, misappropriation, fraud, extortion, smuggling, and cronyism'. See <http://www.minbuza.nl>. UNDP defines it as 'the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit', and, two paragraphs down, 'Political systems are also characterized by high and low levels of corruption.' UNDP (1999), *Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance* (New York: UNDP), p. 7. NORAD points out the Bank's definition and then elaborates: 'corruption is any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private payoff'. It claims that this emphasizes the 'state–society relation' in a more precise way than the Bank does, but it is really little more than an elaboration of the Bank's definition. NORAD (2000), *NORAD's Good Governance & Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2000–2001* (Oslo: NORAD), p. 7.
  - 27 Baylies, C. (1995). "'Political Conditionality" and Democratization', *Review of African Political Economy*, 65, p. 326.
  - 28 Unlike other donors, DIDC believes that 'it is difficult to say where "exactly" is the comparative advantage of a bilateral development agency', personal communication with DIDC staff member.

- 29 NORAD (2000), *NORAD's Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2000–2001*, p. 3.
- 30 NORAD (2001), *Annual Report 2001*, p. 18.
- 31 Because of this, the Bank warns that evaluation of the programme could prove difficult if current standards are adhered to. Instead, 'Defining a standard for success is particularly tricky in such a situation. Rather than aim for the same percentage and standard of success in all types of projects the Bank undertakes, success should be measured in part against the difficulty of the challenges addressed, and if possible against what would have been in place without the intervention.' World Bank (2000), *Reforming Public Institutions & Strengthening Governance*, p. 19.
- 32 Interview with USAID staff member.
- 33 USAID (1999), *Center for Democracy and Governance: User's Guide* (Washington DC: CDG), p. 4.
- 34 See the Center's website at <http://www.info.usaid.gov/democracy/>.
- 35 USAID (1999), *Center Report on Assistance for Democracy Development* (Washington DC: CDG), p. 3.
- 36 USAID (1999), *Promoting Transparency and Accountability: USAID's Anti-Corruption Experience* (Washington DC: Center for Democracy and Governance), p. 4.
- 37 USAID documentation stresses the importance of political will. An example is given by a CDG staff member of the need for political will: in one country USAID put in a computer system to track customs operations only to have a high-level government official order that employees leave the computers turned off. Dininio, P. (1999), 'Defining Anti-Corruption for USAID', *Democracy Dialogue*, June (Washington DC: Center for Democracy and Governance), p. 3. However, it finds that political will is easier to generate in democracies. Indeed, 'Past experience has taught us that ownership of economic policy reform is greater among governments that are democratic, open and transparent.' See Atwood, J. B. (1998), 'Remarks at the Congressional Forum on Africa', Washington DC, 11 March. There is a training module CDG conducts for democracy officers in the field on how to get political will, which emphasizes that it is 'an art not a science'. USAID has learned two lessons when it comes to political will: (1) do not make anti-corruption initiatives contingent upon a 'champion', and (2) even if political will is perceived to exist, always involve civil society in order to truly sustain reforms. Interview with USAID staff member.
- 38 USAID (1999), *Promoting Transparency and Accountability*, p. 5.
- 39 USAID (1999), *Promoting Transparency and Accountability*, pp. 5–6.
- 40 USAID (1999), *Promoting Transparency and Accountability*, pp. 11–15.
- 41 Interview with USAID staff member.
- 42 USAID (1999), *Promoting Transparency and Accountability*, pp. 6–20.
- 43 USAID (1999), *A Handbook on Fighting Corruption*, CDG Technical Publication Series, p. 19.
- 44 Interview with USAID staff member.
- 45 Manziotti, L. (2000), 'Keeping Accounts: a Case Study of Civic Initiatives and Campaign Finance Oversight in Argentina', IRIS, November; Lanyi, A., Guevara, W. and Bell, S. (2000), 'Bolivian Customs Reform: a Case



- Study of Consolidating Democratic Institutions', IRIS, November; Meagher, P. (2000), 'Changing Hands: a Case Study of Financial Sector Governance in Hungary's Market Transition', IRIS, November; Meagher, P., Upadhyaya, K. and Wilkinson, B. (2000), 'Roads with Destinations: a Case Study of Governance and Rural Infrastructure in Nepal', IRIS, January.
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## 6 Conclusion

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